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. . .
A study was conducted ta'de,l'eni[iiie tire relative strengths and
basic rationale for government use b*f«vafious institutions to conduct
aeronautical researjch^ahti; deyelpDmenta(R&D) for the Federal Government. |
The nation's aeronautical ;RSDfinstVl;u€ftnsFvfer;e;,dny.ided'.ijnto-five •
categories: •m'anufac't.ur''ing*'compahies '^'sefv1ce.'Rli^^eoinp,an;i?es, non-profit
R&D institutions, universities, and government laboratories. The
relative roles of these •institutions^were Delineated in regard to con-
ducting basic research,; '.applied research, technology advancement, and ;
development in aeronautics for the Govera^entt 'The relative strengths
and roles of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) labora-
tori es were evaluated within the total context of all of the nation's
aeronautical R&D institutions.
.-V )
i
A total of 25 of the nation's leaders in aeronautical R&D
participated in the study. There was an equal number of leaders from is
each of the five main aeronautical R&D institutions in the United
 :|
States. The investigation was conducted using both a survey question- . |
naire and a new conferencing method called the tributary technique. J
The tributary technique was devised to obtain direct quantitative
measurements of subjective judgments by groups that have both common
and highly- competitive objectives.
 : lj
The nation's aeronautical R&D institutions have characteristic 3
differences which make them individually suitable for particular types f'
of work. The basic strengths of these institutions produce a pattern '• f
of complementary capabilities that properly overlap, but the nation is ; 1
fortunate in having at least one or two institutions that are partic- i 4
ularly well suited for each category of work. For example, it was •(. §
found that government, laboratories, in general, and especially1 NASA ; ,|
laboratories, should be the prime national producers of applied '••/; ! |
research in aeronautics. American aeronautics needs, the new stimulus -\ :'\
of markedly increased outputs of broad-based innovative. research from , > . I
NASA laboratories more than it needs most of the technology advance- ;' ":
 ti
ment and development-oriented programs currently underway in these |
laboratories. The Government should use manufacturing companies for ' . |
the vast bulk of development, most technology advancement, and a ; ; \
substantial amount of applied research in aeronautics. However, the I I
Government will have to implement programs to encourage the transfer ; / °
of full information on technology and research advancements, from the ' ; <
companies that do this work for the Government, to competing companies • ;
that also need the results. Universities should be the primary sources • i
of basic research. Service R&D companies and non-profit R&D institu- ; '[
tions provide valuable, specialized, supplementary technical capa- / :;
bilities and other unique attributes, which together span the entire : 'i
spectrum of aeronautical R&D.. . :
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PREFACE
• '
 ; • . . - . f • : . . . , . J •
This investigation was made possible through the cooperation
of 27 separate organizations in Government and the private sector.
The study presents subjective judgments on fundamental rationale as to
why the Federal Government should use particular segments of the
aeronautical community to conduct basic research, applied research,
technology advancement, and development in aeronautics. A total of 25
of the nation's leaders in aeronautical research and development (R&D)
participated in the study. The participants are listed in the next
section. All participants were directly responsible for work con-
ducted for the Federal Government. Thus, tney all had competitive .
vested interests in the results of this study. Many of them had ;
divergent personal views on the subject as a result of years of experi-
ence within different segments of the aeronautical R&D community.
Therefore, this investigation had substantial potential' 'for producing
conflicting viewpoints among the participants.
Similarly, the reader will undoubtedly have his own initial
views on these issues, if he has been concerned with aeronautical R&D.
This publication is arranged in a form that will allow the reader to
review the processes, determinations, and/logic that the participants
went through during the course of the investigation. Even the author
was surprised at the extent of agreement that emerged within and among
the various groups of participants. The data and observations indi-
cated that the participants were profoundly influenced in their
thinking as they came to grips with basic issues involved in deter-
mining where particular segments of the aeronautical R&D community best
fit into the overall structure of work for the Federal Government.
Hopefully, the reader will also gain an expanded understanding of the
relative strengths and importance of the various segments of the
aeronautical R&D community as he reviews judgments presented from dif-
ferent vantage points.
The author takes responsibility for this investigation as it
has been influenced by its organization, construction, and other
methodology. He is solely responsible for statements made in the
introduction, interpretation of the results, side comments, personal
observations, conclusions, recommendations, and comparisons with other
published data, opinions, and policies. They do not necessarily
represent the positions of individual participants, the sponsor, or any
of the cooperating organizations.
The author thanks the following members of the School of
Business and Management of Pepperdine University who influenced this
investigation. Stewart E. Fliege, the principal faculty advisor on
.the study, provided invaluable guidance on planning, methodology, .
' '
interpretation, and presentation of the results. The author also
acknowledges the contribution of Stephen H. Achte.'hagen who periodi-
cally reviewed the progress of the investigation, influenced the
methodology, and provided many fine ideas on handling the data.
Additionally, thanks are due to Wayne L. Strom who, during his teach-
ings on behavioral theory, laid the groundwork from which the author
was able to develop the tributary conference technique described in-,/.,
this publication. Kenton L. Anderson, in his teachings, providec! sub-
stantial insight into the characteristics of organizations, the factors
that differentiate them, and the elements of effective organizational
structures. Lisa McCormack and various members of the Dean's office of.
the School of Business and Management provided valuable administrative
assistance for this project. Ruth D. Atteberry, Associate Dean,
provided excellent editorial review and advice on preparation of this
publication.
This investigation partially was sponsored by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA-Ames Research Center, under
Grant NSG-2159 which began on June 1, 1976. The author .is indebted to
Harry Hornby, Grant Technical Monitor, and J. Lloyd Jones, Chief, Plans
and Analysis Office, NASA-Ames Research Center. They were responsible
not only for initiating and monitoring this study, but they also
provided some excellent ideas and substantial encouragement during the
course of the investigation. Finally, thanks are due to Hans Mark,
former Director of NASA-Ames Research Center, from whom the author has
learned a great deal about R&D organizational management over the past
three years.
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PARTICIPANTS
The basic results of this study;were the product of the
individual and combined thinking of 25 of the nation's leaders in
aeronautical R&D. Appendix A presents profiles of their backgrounds.
Chapter 3 discusses their selection and adequacy of representation
(pages 47 to 49). They represented 25 different organizations, large
and small, from every sector of the aeronautical R&D community. The
participants in this study were as follows:
.if
Manufacturing Companies
Harold D. Altis
Vice President,
Engineering Technology
McDonnell Aircraft Company
William M. Foley
Deputy Director,
United Technologies Research Center
United Technology Corporation :
James N. Lew
Senior Vice President,
Engineering
Beech Aircraft Corporation
Service R&D Companies
John P. Andes
Vice President,
Aerosciences
Calspan Corporation
Coleman D. Donaldson
President
Aeronautical Research Associates
of Princeton
Charles Henderson
Vice President and Director
of Research and Technology
Atlantic Research Corporation
Robert H. Widmer
Vice President,
Science and Engineering
General Dynamics Corporation
Holden W. Withington
Vice President,
Engineering
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
Jack N. Nielsen
President
Nielsen Engineering and
Research, Inc.
Jack Whitfield ;
Executive Vice President
ARO Inc.
vn
Non-Profit R&D Institutions
Frank E. Gqddard
Assistant Director
Research and Advanced Development
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Ray Laurence Leadabrand
Executive Director
Electronics and Radio Sciences
SRI International
Alan Y. Pope
Associate Director,
Aerodynamics
Sandia Corporation
Universities
Holt Ashley
Professor, Department of
Aeronautical Engineering
Stanford University
Ernest J. Cross
Professor
Aeronautical Engineering
Mississippi State University
Anato! Roshko
Professor
Aeronautics .
California Institute of technology
:Government Laboratories
;
 R. Kenneth Lobb
Technical Director
Naval Air Development Center
Oran W. Nicks
Deputy Director
Langley Research Center
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Colonel Albert E. Preyss
Commander
A.F. Flight Dynamics Laboratory
U.S. Air Force
Elmer H. Schulz
Director
IIT Research Institute
Edward W. Ungar
Associate Director
Battelle Memorial Institute
Martin Summerfield
Professor of
Mronautical Engineering
Princeton University
Lawrence Talbot
Professor, Department of
Mechanical Engineering
University of California, Berkeley
Irving C. Statler
Director, Ames Directorate
U.S. Army Air Mobility Research'
and Development Laboratory
Robert E. Supp ,
Deputy Director
A.F. Aero Propulsion Laboratory
U.S. Air Force
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Chapter 1 . _. , , .^. ,,;, „ .
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents an executive sunrnary, conclusions, and
recommendations from the investigation discussed in this publication.
'. .': GENERAL ;
This investigation was conducted to determine what relation-
ships, if any, exist among the relative strengths of the nation's
aeronautical research and development (R&D) institutions for con-
ducting basic research, applied research, technology advancement, and
development in aeronautics for the Federal Government. A total of 25
of the nation's leaders in aeronautical R&D participated in the study.
There was an equal number of leaders from each of the five main
aeronautical R&D institutions in the United States: manufacturing
companies, service R&D companies, non-profit R&D institutions,
universities, and government laboratories. The institutions and areas
of work are defined in Appendix B on pages 174 through 176. The
investigation was conducted using both a survey questionnaire and a new
conferencing method called the tributary technique. The tributary
technique was devised to obtain direct quantitative measurements of
subjective judgments by groups that have both common and highly
' :i
competitive objectives. The participants were able to express their
judgments in confidence since they could be identified only by
institutional affiliation. The participants' points of view were cast
in the form of consensuses of judgments for the total group of all
participants and for the sub-groups from the various institutions. The
results indicated that there was significant agreement among the total
group of all participants on 96 percent of their judgments. The level
of agreement within any group was taken as being significant only when
» there was a probability of at least 95 percent that the group con-
sensus judgment was the result of a meaningful group determination
II
i
I
I-
judgments was
5-
I .
5 ...
'i
I
I' '
j.
]
i
!
I
rather than chance. The probabi1i ty of chance,
less than J_jn 1OOP.' "
The consensus judgments by the sub-groups representing the dif-
ferent aeronautical R&D institutions were often quite different from
each other. Natural self-oriented biases frequently influenced the
judgments of the sub-groups from the various institutions. However,
a careful analysis of all judgments in the study indicates that insti-
tutional biases essentially were balanced out by using consensus
judgments based on averages of the numerical judgments of all 25
participants. These consensus judgments gave equal weights to view-
points from the various institutions. The conclusions presented in
this section were therefore based upon the consensus of judgments of
all the participants as a group.
There are too many conclusions that can be drawn from the
wide range of results obtained from this investigation to do justice to
them all. The divergent views of the sub-groups and the nature of
biases may be very important relative to many issues.. It also may be
vital to know which rationales were rejected and what the extent of .
agreement was on these viewpoints. In fact, the reader may often wish
to draw his own conclusions from the results relative to specific
issues at hand.
However, there are some important general conclusions and
recommendations that can be formulated, based on the overall views of
the entire group of aeronautical leaders. First, one must accept the
premise that this total group of aeronautical leaders was probably as
knowledgeable about America's aeronautical R&D institutions as any
group that might be convened. It then stands to reason that signifi-
cant agreement among these aeronautical leaders, as a group, probably
yielded correct determinations of the relative strengths, supporting
rationale, and best roles for these institutions in regard to con-
ducting aeronautical R&D for the Federal Government.
The following general conclusions are based upon the overall
group consensus judgments of the 25 aeronautical leaders and other,
information gained during this -nvestigation. General conclusions are
presented for each of the five aeronautical R&D institutions, in turn,
7
and then for the laboratories of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA),'which are a special case within the general "
category of government laboratories. .
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES , . . . - . -
Manufacturing companies are,strongly oriented, in all their
R&D activities, toward achieving competitive, profitable, manufactured
products. Their highly directed attention to end products yields
characteristics that coincide, better than those of any other aero-
nautical R&D institution, with the Government's need for highly effec-
tive, concentrated, arid well organized efforts in the final stages of
the R&D process. At the same time, the product orientation of manu-
facturing companies greatly reduces their usefulness to the Government
for work in the early stages of aeronautical R&D and limits their
technical activities in other ways that broadly impact the progress of
American aeronautics. • •
Development. Manufacturing companies are by far the most
logical institutions to conduct the vast bulk of development work in
aeronautics for the Federal Government. Manufacturing companies have
the greatest ability to produce a totally satisfactory product,
including post-manufacturing support. -The potential for volume pro-
duction provides manufacturing companies the proper motivation to carry
development programs the entire way from inception to successful
manufactured products. Manufacturing companies characteristically
produce the highest quality of development work. They have the highest
ability of any of the aeronautical R&D institutions to focus on
achieving solutions to specific real problems. Government funding for
development programs in manufacturing companies helps to maintain
their world-wide competitive positions. Such funding is essential in
order to create new products that are in the national interest, when
.these development programs are beyond the financial capability of
industry.
However, manufacturing companies should not have more than a
very small percentage of the total capital value of major aeronautical
experimental facilities built by the Government. Manufacturing
companies are also not the best sources for impartial technical guid-
ance to the Government on development contracts to other organizations.
Technology advancement. Manufacturing companies should play
the dominant role in aeronautical technology advancement for the.
Federal Government. They have the facilities (manufacturing) and the,,
knowledge (technology) to do it. Manufacturing companies character-
istically produce the highest quality of technology advancements and
they have the greatest ability to focus their efforts on achieving
important gains. The Government should fund technology advancement
work in manufacturing companies so that they can stay abreast of new
advancements and gain a world-wide competitive advantage. Furthermore'^
technology advancement is part of the logical process of developing
needed high technology products. It is also important for manufac-
turing companies to conduct technology advancement for the Government
in order to define cost performance, risks, and profit potential of
possible new products.
However, there is a serious drawback in placing the vast bulk
of the Government's contracts for technology advancement with manu-
. facturing companies. Manufacturing companies are characteristically
the least willing of any aeronautical R&D institution to provide outside
organizations with full information on the results of these programs.
Nevertheless, the need to use manufacturing companies to advance •
aeronautics technology is too compelling to direct most of this work
into more open aeronautical R&D institutions. This dilemma cannot be
reconciled unless the Government's intervention in the normal process
of industry competition, by funding technology advancement in certain
firms, is also accompanied by effective governmental measures to help
all aeronautical firms share fully in the results. , f
Manufacturing companies have next-to-the-lowest ability of all
five aeronautical R&D.institutions to provide the Government with
impartial technical guidance on technology advancement contracts with
other organizations. The Government needs other institutions for this
function.
Applied research. Manufacturing companies should play the
second-greatest national role, among the five institutions, in pro-
viding applied research in aeronautics for the Government. Applied
. - - •. \
research is part of the logical process of developing needed high
technology products in manufacturing companies, Applied research will j
help manufacturing companies stay ahead in development and gain a
national competitive advantage. Manufacturing companies sometimes have
unique capabilities to carry out applied research by virtue of their
proximity to development problems. When applied, research is conducted ..-
in manufacturing companies it helps them attract, develop, and retain .
people with needed skills.
There are some significant factors that should moderate the
extent of the role played by manufacturing companies in conducting
applied research for the Federal Government. Manufacturing companies
characteristically produce nearly-the-lowest quality of applied
research among the five aeronautical R&D institutions. Manufacturing
companies are the least willing of all aeronautical R&D institutions to
provide full information on the results of their government-funded
research. While applied research in manufacturing companies helps them
guide their own organizations' work, it does not help the Government
guide its contract work with other organizations. Manufacturing
companies are the least able of any institution to provide the
Government with impartial technical guidance on applied research con-
tracts with other organizations. In addition, research groups in
manufacturing companies will not have constant access to major
government-built aeronautical experimental facilities, which might be
advantageous to research. Only a small percentage of these facilities
should be located at or under the control of manufacturing companies.
Basic research. Manufacturing companies should play the
smallest role of any aeronautical R&D institution in government-spon-
sored basic research. However, they should do some basic research.
Sometimes a manufacturing company has a unique capability to conduct-
basic research of a particular type. Basic research provides manu-
facturing companies with JiMl0tHfe/WeiWJV new advancements. Working in
the field helps manufacturing companies capitalize on these new
findings by others and it allows them to move these advancements into
the applied research phase. The work in basic research gives manu- •'
facturing -companies a far-term perspective. It helps them avoid ••'•.'•
near-term focusing of their R&D efforts and thus prevents technological
surprise.
However, manufacturing companies characteristically produce the
lowest quality of basic research of the five institutions. They are
the least willing to provide full information on their results. Manu-
facturing companies should not have more than a small percentage of the
major, governments-built, experimental facilities that might also;be
useful in basic research. While basic research will help manufacturing
companies in guiding their other work, it will not materially aid the
Government in obtaining technical guidance for its other basic research
contracts. Compared to other aeronautical R&O institutions, manu-
facturing companies are characteristically the worst sources of impar-
tial technical guidance to the Government on basic research contracts
with other organizations.
SERVICE R&D COMPANIES •
Service R&D companies tend to be highly effective technical
organizations in certain specialty areas. They are oriented to pro-
viding services that augment permanent staffs in government labora-
tories, industry, and non-profit R&D institutions. The Government can
draw on the available pools of specialized talent in service R&D
companies without creating as permanent an investment in personnel as
would be required by conducting such work in government laboratories.
While the specialized roles of service R&D companies should span the
entire spectrum of aeronautical R&D, their greatest natural roles
relative to other institutions tend to be in technology advancement and
applied research. Service R&D companies have'a characteristic
capability to focus on achieving solutions to specific real problems
that is second only to that of manufacturing companies. Service R&D
companies tend to be more willing to supply full information on the
results of government-funded work than manufacturing companies, but
service R&D companies are not so open in this respect as are the other
aeronautical R&D institutions. Service R&D companies should have a
minor proportion of the nation's major aeronautical experimental
facilities built by the Federal Government.
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Development. Service R&D companies should play a small role in |
conducting aeronautical development work for the Government. The . ]
activities of service R&D companies in conducting development should be *
far below that of manufacturing companies, but roughly on a par with f
government laboratories. Service R&D companies may achieve the ?
most-effective product development in technical areas where they have 1
unique capabilities. This may well be the case for certain relatively |
small aeronautical products. Service R&D companies may provide an <
economical source of development. In general, the quality of develop- |
ment work in service R&D companies is second only to that of manufac- f
turing companies. Service R&D companies characteristically have at ?
least as good an ability to provide impartial technical guidance to the
Government on development contracts as other institutions in the
private sector.
Technology advancement. Service R&D companies should play a
small but significant overall role in technology advancement for the
Government. Their role in advancing aeronautical technology should be ";
second only to that of manufacturing companies, but about equal to the
role of government laboratories. Service R&D companies have special
capabilities and economically can supply technology advancements in a
timely fashion. Service R&D companies are able to tie technology to a • !
product or other end application. In general, the quality of work in .;
technology advancement produced by service R&D companies is second only ••• .
to that of manufacturing companies. However, service R&D companies are \\
not the best sources for impartial technical guidance to the Government
 :':
on technology advancement contracts with other organizations. ; •• ;
Applied research/ Service R&D companies should play a small
but significant national role in conducting applied research in aero- , : .
nautics for the Federal Government. Service R&D companies-supply
 ; ;
applied research economically and in a timely fashion. The quality of ••• ...I
their applied research is characteristically about average among the ' j
five aeronautical R&D institutions. However, service R&D companies ;
rank next to last in their ability to provide the Government with
impartial technical guidance on applied research contracts with other
organizations.
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Basic research. Service R&D companies should probably play
only a very minor role in basic research. The extent of their activi-
ties in basic research should be next to the lowest among all aero-
nautical R&D institutions. The quality of basic research in service
.R&D companies tends to be lower than that of all the aeronautical R&D
institutions, except manufacturing companies. The ability of service
R&D companies to provide the Government with impartial technical guid-
ance on basic research similarly tends to be next to the lowest of the
five aeronautical R&D institutions.
NON-PROFIT R&D INSTITUTIONS
Non-profit R&D institutions are similar to service R&D compa-
nies in that they supply valuable supplementary capabilities in aero-
nautical R&D for the Government. Non-profit R&D institutions sometimes
have unique technical capabilities in special fields. The role of
non-profit R&D institutions in performing aeronautical R&D spans the
entire spectrum of R&D. However, as producers of aeronautical R&D,
non-profit R&D institutions play their greatest roles in basic and
applied research. Non-profit R&D institutions should have a small
percentage of the major aeronautical experimental facilities built by
the Government.
The organizational features of non-profit R&D institutions also
make them uniquely useful to the Government for certain other aero-
nautical R&D tasks. They can be used by the Government for objective
technical.analyses, technical support,, and for second sources on
technical evaluations. Non-profit R&D institutions do not compete with
industry by manufacturing products nor do they have stockholders
demanding profits, dividends, and capital gains. Non-profit R&D insti-
tutions can thus work with -'ndustry and can protect proprietary infor-
mation in a fashion similar to government organizations. At the same
time, non-profit R&D institutions are in the private sector and they
are not subject to many of the constraints placed on government
organizations. Thus, government organizations can use non-profit R&D
institutions to add technical competence and flexibility to their
capability to accomplish the Government's portion of the technical work.
Non-profit R&D institutions tend to have a greater ability to focus on
I "' ' ' ..'."•"'' ' • •
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solving specific real problems than do government laboratories. Non-
profit R&D institutions are exceeded in this respect only by manufac-
turing companies, and service R&D companies. However, non-profit R&D
institutions are more willing to provide outside organizations full ;
1
 information on the results of their work for the Government than are
manufacturing companies or service R&D companies.
: ;t
- Development. Non-profit R&D institutions should'conduct only a
very small amount of the total development work in aeronautics for the
Government. In fact, non-profit R&D institutions should be the
smallest participant in aeronautical development of any R&D institu-
tion, except universities. Non-profit R&D institutions may have cer-
tain unique capabilities in specialized areas which can be of value in
performing aeronautical development work. However, the quality of the
aeronautical development work by non-profit R&D institutions tends to
be next to the lowest among the five aeronautical R&D institutions.
On the other hand, the ability of non-profit R&D institutions to pro-
vide the Government with impartial technical guidance on development
contracts is characteristically at least as good as any other R&D
institution in the private sector can provide.
Technology advancement. The relative role of non-profit R&D
institutions in aeronautical technology advancement for the Government
should be small, but greater .than their role in development. Non-
profit R&D institutions should play next-to-the-smallest role in
I , performing technology-advancement activities in aeronautics for the
I Government. The Government can use non-profit R&D institutions on the
I • government side of its aeronautical R&D activities and yet circumvent
| ! federal restraints. Sometimes there are'special government problems or
|j ; needs where it is necessary to have a non-profit R&D institution con-
I duct technology advancement in order to utilize their non-product
;; ' objectivity, that is, a lack of commercial bias and absence of coupling
to manufacturing. The ability of non-profit R&D institutions to pro-
vide the Government technical guidance on technology advancement
contracts in aeronautics is second only to that of government labora-
* cories. Non-profit R&D institutions provide a less permanent commit-
r* • ' . • -
ment to personnel than government laboratories. The characteristic
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quality of technology advancement by non-profit R&D institutions is
• average among the five aeronautical R&D institutions and it is roughly
on a par with the quality of technology advancement work by government
laboratories. •
Applied' research. Non-profit R&D institutions should share
significantly in conducting applied research in aeronautics for the
. .: -•:;.- Federal Government. The total extent of'their applied research-activi-
: ties should add up to substantially less than that of government
laboratories and manufacturing companies, but it should be about equal
to the roles played by universities and service R&D companies. Non-
profit R&D institutions have special organizational characteristics of
use to the Government, as mentioned in the previous section. Non-
profit R&D institutions bridge the gap between universities and govern-
ment organizations. The quality of aeronautical applied research from
non-profit R&D institutions tends to be second only to that of govern-
ment laboratories. Non-profit R&D institutions "should be used by the
Government for applied research if they have the physical resources to
do the work required. Their ability to provide the Government with
impartial technical guidance on applied research contracts is second
• only to the ability of government laboratories.
Basic research. Non-profit R&D institutions should play a
> relatively small, but significant, role in aeronautical basic research
,
 ;for the Government. The total extent of their activities in basic
. research should amount to substantially less than those of universi-
ties and government laboratories. However, non-profit R&D institutions
should probably play a larger role in basic research for the Government
than service R&D companies or manufacturing companies. The quality of
basic research in non-profit R&D institutions is characteristically
second only to that of universities. The organizational form of non-
I profit R&D institutions allows them to work for the Government in a
| fashion similar to government laboratories and yet circumvent federal
I constraints. They can function as captive laboratories to the Govern-
"ment and perform basic research on a long-term basis. Non-profit R&D
institutions should be used for basic research if they have the
necessary talent and the physical resources. However, non-profit R&D
'• • -.tV "' • •'
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institutions have only an average ability, relative to the other
institutions, to provide the Government with impartial technical advice
on basic research contracts with other organizations. /
UNIVERSITIES . , - , , , ' .
The very characteristics of universities make them ideally
suited to.be the leading institution for conducting basic research.in ..
aeronautics for the Federal Government. Their orientation towards
education, which is the primary purpose of their institution, creates
a climate for concentrating on the fundamentals of aeronautics. Their
occupation with students, inquiry, and dealing with basics completely
pervades the institution's activities. The general orientation of
universities attracts people suited to learning and teaching by virtue
of intelligence and independent nature. Universities are naturally
the most willing, of all aeronautical R&D institutions, to provide
full information on the results or their work for the Government.
There is a strong element of striving for objective inquiry that has
also been deemed useful in providing technical .advice to the
Government.
However, the same strong orientations that are so valuable for
basic research in universities make them considerably less useful for
more applied tasks. Universities tend to have, the lowest ability to
focus on achieving solutions to specific real problems relative to
other aeronautical R&D institutions. Thus, universities are primarily
research institutions, with the greatest emphasis on basic research.
Universities should have a small percentage of the major aeronautical
experimental facilities built by the Government. •
Development. The universities have essentially no role in
aeronautical development.for the Government. No significant rationale
has been found to support university activity in development for the
Government. Universities characteristically produce aeronautical-
development work of lower quality than that of any other aeronautical
R&D institution. Universities have the lowest ability to provide-tech-
nical guidance to the Government on aeronautical development contracts.
In spite of their probable impartiality, it does not seem wise to use
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disproportionately large numbers of university professors on govern-
ment advisory groups for aeronautical development programs.
Technology advancement. Universities should play only a minute
role in aeronautical technology advancement for the Government.- The
universities' activities in technology advancement should.be substan-
tially/less than. the roles played by all other aeronautical R&D- •
institutions. However, there are some instances where universities can
provide unique sources for technology advancement. A small amount of
work in this area can sometimes further the training of students for
the later practice of engineering. It would also help universities in
interfacing better with industry. The presence in universities of
fundamental scientists contributes to the innovative thinking process
essential to the achievement of large technology jumps. On the other
hand, universities characteristically produce the lowest quality of
work in technology advancement of any aeronautical R&D institution.
They have the lowest ability to provide the Government with technical.
guidance on technology advancement contracts with other organizations,
even though university advisors are likely to be impartial . As in the
case of development, it does not seem appropriate to use dispropor-
tionately large numbers of university professors oh senior government
advisory groups that influence critical decisions on technology
advancement programs in aeronautics.
Applied research. Universities should have. a substantially
lesser role in conducting applied research in aeronautics for the
Government than the roles of either government laboratories or manu-
facturing companies. However,, the extent of university activities in
applied research should be roughly on a par with service R&D companies
and non-profit R&D institutions. Applied research is an integral part
of the educational process in engineering schools. Graduate engineer-
ing students, who are low cost, energetic, and questioning, are often
strongly motivated towards applied research. Universities sometimes
have the unique facilities and the talent to do applied research. The
long lifetimes typical of some applied research projects are com-
patible with university patterns. On the other hand, the quality of
university-applied research in aeronautics is characteristically below
that of almost any other aeronautical R&D institution. Universities
-.
are about average, among the R&D institutions, in their ability to pro-
vide the Government impartial technical guidance on applied research
. . " • . • ' - '
contracts with other organizations.
| Basic research.. Universities should perform the major national
l| role in providing aeronautical basic research for the Government. In
& . ••- .
: fact, .the role of universities in providing aeronautical basic research
!' for the Government sho.uld be roughly equivalent to the combined roles
| of all other aeronautical R&D institutions. Universities have atmo-
spheres that draw people qualified by independence and motivation to do
basic research. Graduate students, who are low cost, energetic, and
questioning, have an idealistic approach to basic research. Universi-
I ties characteristically perform the highest quality of basic research
* of any aeronautical R&D institution. Basic research is an integral
I part of the education process. Universities should be funded by the
Government to do basic research to further the development of specific
capabilities that are in the national interests. Universities are
probably second only to government laboratories in ability to provide
the Government with impartial technical guidance on basic research
contracts.
GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES
!' • ' The government laboratories provide important technical contri-
\ butions to aeronautical R&D and play vital central management roles
•; within the total complex of America's aeronautical R&D institutions.
;. Government laboratories gain their natural orientations and their most
important capabilities from three main factors: (a) their positions
within the Government, (b) the knowledge they derive from the technical
; work they perform, and (c) the substantial resources they can direct
toward technical objectives. The most important role of" government
laboratories is in technical guidance within the Government for plan-
ning and executing aeronautical R&D programs. Government laboratories
characteristically have the greatest ability, of any aeronautical- R&D
institution, to provide impartial technical guidance to the-Government
on contracts from basic research through development.
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Government laboratories are vital to communications and working
relationships between the Government and the nation's other aeronauti-
cal R&D institutions. Government laboratories should be advocates,
critics, and interpreters within the Government, of advancements that
have been or could be made by all of the nation's aeronautical R&D
, institutions. Government laboratories should play a major role in
translating the nation's aeronautical-needs into specific research and
technology advancement tasks. They have the resources to move funda-
mental advancements into the more applied stages of the R&D process.
Government laboratories should strive to increase the overall national
capability in aeronautical R&D. Government laboratories should not
only produce technical advancements, in-house and under contract, but
they should also use all their influence and resources to insure that
the results of R&D purchased with tax dollars are made widely available
to all American aeronautical R&D institutions. Government laboratories
are second only to universities in their willingness to provide outside
organizations with full information on government-funded research and
technology.
Government laboratories should conduct some in-house technical
work in all phases of aeronautical R&D in order to provide skills,
knowledge, and understanding so that they can properly perform their
other broad government roles in aeronautical R&D. They have the most
diversified natural capabilities of any aeronautical R&D institution,
as reflected by their being the only institution which produces a
quality of work that characteristically ranks in the upper half of
institutions over the entire aeronautical R&D spectrum. However,
government laboratories are best suited and are most needed as major
producers of basic and applied research in aeronautics. The position
of government laboratories within the Government also leads to a lack
of orientation and creates physical restrictions that prevent them from
being top performers in technology advancement and development work.
Government laboratories characteristically have next-to-the-lowest
ability to focus on achieving solutions to specific real problems com-
pared to the other aeronautical R&D institutions.. Government labora-
tories should be the guardians of most of these government facilities
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so that the results from these facilities and access to them will be
available to all segments of the aeronautical R&D community.
The role of government laboratories as a primary producer of
research is greatly enhanced by their access to. major aeronautical
experimental facilities built by the Government. However, a large
portion of major government experimental facilities;should also ,be ,.;
made easily available to other aeronautical R&D institutions by placing
them in central government test centers which do not have their own
resident government R&D groups.
Development. Government laboratories should play only a very
small role in conducting their own development work. They should do
development work in areas where they already have a unique capability
for it. Development work by government laboratories provides an
arsenal system of manufacturing in areas where there is little
industrial/commercial interest. Government laboratories must be
engaged in development to provide knov/ledge and life cycle laboratory
support for operational systems. However, government laboratories
characteristically produce about average quality of development work
relative to the other four aeronautical R&D institutions. Thus,
government laboratories should not be major development .organizations.
Technology .advancement. Government laboratories should play a
small but significant role in providing aeronautical technology
advancements. Their in-house efforts in technology advancement should
be far below that of manufacturing companies. Government laboratories
and service R&D companies should be the two greatest sources of tech-
nology advancements in aeronautics. Technology advancement should be
done within government laboratories in order to provide knowledgeable
buyers of the developp<i product. Technology funded within: government
laboratories often provides unique facilities accessible to development
groups in the public and private sectors. Government laboratories have
resources to support prototype development, which are not;avail able to
a single industrial organization. Technology that is funded-within the
Government becomes available to all aeronautical R&D institutions,
which helps to maintain an open competitive environment for the
developed product. However, government laboratories characteristically
produce only average quality of work in technology advancement relative
to the other four aeronautical R&D institutions.
Applied research. Government laboratories should be the
greatest source of applied research in aeronautics for the Government.
Government.laboratories characteristically produce the highest quality :
of applied research of any aeronautical R&D institution. Government j
laboratories should conduct applied research to provide knowledgeable , '
leadership for coordinating and guiding aeronautical R&D. Applied
research should be done by government laboratories to provide quick
response capabilities to solve the Government's operational systems
problems. Large-scale facilities which might be required for applied
research can be best built and operated by the government laboratories.
Government laboratories should conduct applied research when there is a
lack of commercial incentives. The applied research done by government1
j laboratories provides them information, skill, and knowledge necessary
5
I to permit them to conduct independent evaluations of competitive R&D.
I Basic research. The government laboratories should be second
j only to universities, among all aeronautical R&D institutions, as the.-:
I nation's primary source of government-funded basic research in aeronau-
l tics. Basic research conducted within government laboratories facili-
tates a.transfer of basic research knowledge into applied research.
Basic research in government laboratories provides a reservoir of
aeronautical knowledge in the public domain. Government laboratories
I should particularly conduct basic research in cases where the research
can benefit from any unique facilities they may have. Government
:, laboratories could provide a stable environment for long-term,.,
high-risk research.
NASA LABORATORIES
The current conclusions regarding the relative strengths and
roles of NASA laboratories are based on consideration of the roles
played by all aeronautical R&D institutions. The laboratories in NASA
fall within the general class of government laboratories. However,
there are substantial differences between NASA laboratories and other
government aeronautical laboratories. Three government agencies have .
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their own laboratories engaged in aeronautical R&D: the Department of
Defense (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Department of Transportation,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. At present,
NASA is the only one of these, three agencies that is not itself a
prime customer for the final products resulting from its in-house and
contracted aeronautical,R&D. NASA is the only agency that does not
conduct regular aeronautical operations using these products. NASA is
not a major developer nor a purchaser of civil aircraft. These activi-
ties are the respective domains of aircraft manufacturing companies and
commercial airlines. Furthermore, the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 does not give NASA the roles of coordinating national aero-
nautical R&D nor providing advisory services to other aeronautical
institutions as was legally required of its predecessor, the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The NASA is an independent
government agency charged with promoting advances in aeronautics for
other agencies and institutions. Therefore, the general conclusions of
this study for government laboratories must be made more specific for
NASA laboratories.
The laboratories in NASA should be prime producers of basic and
applied research in aeronautics. American aeronautics needs the new
stimulus of massive outputs of broad-based innovative research from
NASA laboratories more than it needs most of the specialized technology
advancement and development-oriented programs currently underway in
NASA laboratories. NASA laboratories are in excellent central posi-
tions to conduct research by virtue of their locations in a separate
government agency. NASA laboratories have a natural orientation for
broad-based, systematic, and highly innovative research. The research
in NASA laboratories will aid NASA in guiding' its own aeronautical R&D
contract programs. It will also assist them in certain high-level
government advisory functions and in long-term studies of the national
benefits to be gained from aeronautical R&D.
The rationale that indicates that government laboratories, in
general, should be prime producers of aeronautical basic and applied
research largely holds true for the specific case of NASA laboratories.
In fact, much of this rationale stemmed from Consideration of NASA
-.- . -i ;-t
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laboratories. The NASA laboratories have many of the same character-
istics attributed to the government laboratories, such as their
exceptionally great willingness to provide full information on the . .
results of government-sponsored R&D. The NASA laboratories should
.-
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share in the role of other government laboratories as users and guard-
ians of a major portion of the nation's large-scale aeronautical
>i :.-,. v . • • • . • • • ' :•' . - ' - ' ' • •••*. - U .
'' experimental facilities built by the Government. These major 'NASA
• experimental facilities make it possible for NASA laboratories, in
particular, to be mass producers of high-quality innovative research.
Development. Perhaps a quarter of the current work by NASA
laboratories in aeronautics is so highly oriented toward specific
applications and hardware that it must be considered in the development
phase of aeronautical R&D. NASA laboratories should be hardly involved
in in-house development activities in aeronautics. There is no valid
rationale for NASA laboratories to conduct their own aeronautical
development activities. The quality of development work by NASA
laboratories is below that of manufacturing companies and service R&D
companies; however, the quality of aeronautical development work by
NASA laboratories is better than that of the old NACA and about equal
to that of other government laboratories. The characteristic quality
of development work by government laboratories is only average relative
'.- to the other four aeronautical R&D institutions. However, there are.
additionale rationales for other government laboratories to conduct
development work in aeronautics. Hence, the development-oriented work
in NASA laboratories should not constitute nearly so large a portion of
their total aeronautical activities as is apparently the case. ;
•
:
 Technology advancement. ^ NASA laboratories currently seem '; to be
devoting about a third of their efforts in aeronautics to technology
advancement. The role of NASA laboratories in technology advancement
should be far smaller than it is at the present time. The only valid
rationale for NASA laboratories to conduct technology advancement is if
they have an existing unique capability to accomplish it. The quality
of technology advancement from NASA laboratories is about the same as
it was for the NACA laboratories. However, NASA laboratories should
probably devote even less work to technology advancement than did NACA,
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unless NASA assumes similar roles. The NASA laboratories characteris-
tically produce about the same quality of technology advancement as do
government laboratories in general, which is about average among the
five aeronautical R&D institutions. The small role of government
laboratories in technology advancement is justified by additional
rationale beyond that which applies to NASA laboratories. It therefore
seems logical that NASA laboratories should have an-even smaller role '
in conducting aeronautical technology advancement than do other govern-
ment laboratories.
Applied research. Tne primary role of NASA's aeronautical
J
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laboratories should be to conduct applied research. The nation's
aeronautics industry and other governmental agencies need more applied
research from NASA laboratories than the combination of their output in
all other categories of NASA's in-house aeronautical R&D. The output
of applied research from NASA laboratories should be roughly doubled.
Such an increase is necessary in order to bring the supply of NASA's
applied research into better balance with the relative demand.
Apparently, NASA's aeronautical laboratories are devoting a far smaller
portion of their total in-house aeronautics efforts to applied research
than did the old NACA laboratories. Even the quality of aeronautical
applied research by NASA's laboratories is lower than that of NACA
laboratories.
There is substantial rationale for NASA laboratories to assume
a prime national role in providing massive amounts of stimulative,
systematic, and innovative applied research to the aeronautics industry.
The NASA laboratories should conduct applied research in order to per-
mit independent evaluation of competitive aeronautical R&D.; In-house
applied research by NASA provides it the knowledge necessary to con-
tract aeronautical R&D properly to the private sector. The applied
research in NASA laboratories provides NASA the knowledge necessary to
give leadership for coordinating and guiding R&D. The large-scale
facilities available in NASA can benefit applied research. The NASA
should conduct applied research where there is a lack of corniercial
incentive. The quality of applied research from NASA laboratories is
characteristically about equal to that of all government laboratories
•~nrr*t'>«ti*j-t -rr?*r-
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in general, which tend to produce higher quality of applied research
than any other aeronautical R&D institution. . ,-
Basic research. The second greatest role for NASA laboratories
in aeronautics should be in basic research. The basic.research output
of NASA laboratories should be almost doubled in order for NASA to
play its proper national role in this area. The percentage of basic
research produced by NASA's aeronautical 1 abpra tor ies0 today .seems,, to be
roughly half as large as it was for the old NACA laboratories. The
quality of NASA's basic research in aeronautics also seems to be lower
than it was under NACA laboratories.
There are a number of reasons why NASA should conduct basic
research. Basic research by NASA provides a reservoir of aeronautical
knowledge in the public domain. The NASA laboratories should conduct
basic research in areas where they have the talent. The quality of
basic research in NASA aeronautical laboratories is about equal to that
of overall government laboratories, which ranks second only to that of
universities. The NASA laboratories should do basic research in areas
where they have unique facilities. Most of the major government-built
experimental facilities should remain within government laboratories,
including within NASA laboratories. The NASA experimental facilities
would be available to NASA resident research groups. Basic research in
NASA laboratories facilitates transfer of basic research knowledge into
applied research.
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The following personal recommendations also are made based on
an analysis of all the information gained during the course of this
investigation. .
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
The NASA should consider advocating that it become the central
aeronautical research agency for the Federal Government. This role for
NASA should not exclude highly mission-oriented research efforts by
other government laboratories. However, NASA could provide an
efficient central agency for the bulk of the Government's
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stimulative aeronautical research efforts for both military and civil
aeronautics.
Serious consideration should be given in NASA to advocating
that it also assume a role as a national advisory and coordinating body
for aeronautical R&D. The rationale for NASA's activities in aeronau-
tics, as a government laboratory system, would become far stronger if
such working links to outside technology programs, development pro-
grams, and aviation operations were established.
The NASA should consider setting up a special internal manage-
ment structure for aeronautics similar to that of the old NACA. This
should be a partnership arrangement with "interlocking boards of '.._„;.---
directors" such as NACA had for over 40 .years. It probably will not be
possible for NASA to serve effectively as the central government
coordinating, advisory, and research agency in aeronautics unless it
establishes such a management link with the nation's prime aeronautical
organizations.
An investigation should be conducted to examine the role of
NASA's contract program in advancing aeronautical R&D. This role might
possibly be different than the role of NASA's in-house work in aeronau-
tics which was examined during this investigation.
GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES / ' -.
Government laboratories should go to extremes to select work
that will yield'results of maximum value to national aeronautics, as a
whole. A careful examination should be matio of how government labora-
tories might improve the transfer of full information, on advances
made under government R&D contracts, to all American aeronautical R&D
organizations that need it. The government laboratories have substan-
tial influence in industry and they also have the resources to gather
information and make it available in a highly usable form.
ALL AERONAUTICAL R&D INSTITUTIONS /
Every organization in aeronautical R&D should make a funda-
mental evaluation of its own strengths, weaknesses, natural orienta-
tions, goals, and relationships to other organizations. Numerous case
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histories and general studies have shown that poor performance by an
organization is usually caused by unawareness, neglect, or disregard
of these basic factors. The data obtained in the current study suggest
that these fundamental considerations, which seem so very simple on the
surface, are probably not well understood by many aeronautical R&D
organizations.
The tributary technique can be used, for many types of funda-
mental organizational assessments. It is rapid and it reduces the
expenditure of top management's time. However, this new technique must
be tailored for each situation. The tributary technique requires sub-
stantially more preparation and later analysis than do more casual
conferencing methods. The timing must be precise and every structural
detail has to be carefully worked out in advance. The key to success
in using the tributary technique is to pretest every aspect of the
final procedure. The tributary technique might be constructed to ' j
examine, successively, such things as an organization's strengths,
weaknesses, propensities of its people, customer needs, future oppor-
tunities, goals, and related management factors. I
Advisory group methods for aeronautical R&D can and should be |
improved. For example, all advisory groups should use segment "analysis j
techniques. Conference structure methods should also be upgraded to !
fit specific needs. Experience from the current investigation indi- ji
cates that it is possible to create conference environments, even in
highly competitive situations, where advisors can be themselves,
represent their own interests, and freely provide their best judgments.
Chapter 2
INTRODUCTION
• '
This investigation examines basic rationale for government
use of different institutions to conduct aeronautical research and
development. The Government consistently has supported research and
development (R&D) in the United States for 150 years. Nevertheless,
the history of government involvement in R&D has been rich in
controversy (1). The difficulty that the American government has had
in formulating policy on R&D, in this basically free enterprise
system, has probably never been more evident than over the last decade.
The issues historically have fallen into three broad categories: the
extent of government financing for R&D, the areas of government sup-
port, and the relative roles of government and private R&D institu-
tions. This introduction reviews current problems in all three of
these categories in order to establish a complete framework for consid-
ering the institutional questions in aeronautical R&D.
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR R&D
There was a total of about $38 billion invested in R&D in the
United States in 1976 (2:2). For over a quarter of a century, the
Federal Government has been the source of more than half the funds
annually invested in R&D in the United States (3:13; 4:2). .- However,
the federal budgets for R&D have shown a downward fend over the last
ten years. Federal funding for R&D steadily increased, in constant
dollars, at average annual compound rates between 5.3 and 14 percent
from 1953 to 1967 (4:2). The private sector increased its investment
in R&D at a compound rate of 7.2 to 7.8 percent during the same period.
1Notation (3:13; 4:2) means Reverence 3: page 13 and
Reference 4: page 2.
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The total national investment in R&D peaked in 1964 at about 3 percent
of the gross national product (4:3). At that time, the Federal Govern-
ment provided roughly two-thirds of all funding for R&D. Federal R&D
funding, in constant dollars, reached its maximum in 1967. The
federal contribution to R&D dropped from 2 percent to 1.- ; arcent of
the gross national product between 1964 and 1976 (4:3). The private
, sector continued to support. R&D at between 1 and 1.1 percent o,f the
gross national product throughout the years from 1955 to 1976 (4:3;
5:3). Hence, the gradual federal withdrawal from investments in R&D
over the last decade was totally responsible for a decline of 27 per-
cent in the annual national investment in R&D to 2.2 percent of the
gross national product by 1976 (4:2).
In spite of what seems to be true from the history of civiliza-
tions, both ancient and modern, economists have not been able to relate
quantitatively investments in national R&D and technological innovation
to economic growth. A National Science Foundation report in 1974
pointed out that
The impact of technological innovation on productivity
and economic growth is ... understood only in general
terms. Present knowledge of the causal connection between
innovation and economic returns is not sufficient for
developing quantitative indicators of the relationship (6:94).
However, there have been studies on return on investment from R&D for
companies in specific industries (6:110; 7:25-26; 8) and on the
influence of R&D on national economic progress (8:2). The results of
these studies have led most economists to recognize that the impact of"
R&D on economic growth is quite high (8; 9). .-
The value of federal expenditures for R&D are particularly dif-
ficult to quantify in economic terms. Most federal R&D outlays-go for
defense, space, regulatory activities, and other objectives where the
primary benefits to society ara not reflected in economic quantities.
Two-thirds of the federal expenditures for R&D- in 1976 were for
defense and space (4:2-3). Other federal R&D programs promote safety,
health, the quality of life, intellectual growth, and the general
welfare of the nation. The secondary benefits from technical advances
from federal R&D programs often impact the national economy. However,
the effects are so pervasive that they are difficult to trace and
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evaluate. The net effects of most federal R&D on the overall national
economy is not measurable solely from increased sales and profits for
the companies conducting the R&D for the Government. This fact has
apparently led some researchers to assume that effects they cannot now
directly measure and correlate in economic qurntities ere.not signifi--
cant. These wild assumptions lead to partial economic analyses which
imply that federal R&Dndoes not warrant the investment (10; 1.1; 12). ....
If such fields as science, medicine, politics, philosophy, and the arts
had waited for economic analysis to prove the worth of every effort
before attempting to move forward, civilization would probably still bf.
in the Dark Ages.
It is becoming increasingly apparent to wide elements of both
the public and private sectors that serious alterations have been
occurring in the relative rate of technological progress and the
growth of the U.S. economy since the decline of the federal investment
in R&D (3; 8; 9; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17). America's per capita income has
moved from first to fifth place in rankings relative to other major
nations (16:51). The gain in U.S. productivity between I960 and 1974
was less than that of fourlother major industrial nations (6:23-24).
In fact, America achieved only one-fifth of the increase in productivity
that Japan recorded. The patent balance of the United States relative
to other nations fell 30 percent between 1966 and 1973 (6:17). The
patent balance i. the difference between U.S. patents granted in for-
eign countries and foreign patents granted in the United States. There
is little doubt that America's technological and industrial lead has
been slipping.
Foreign competi.ti'"* to U.S. manufactured goods, particularly
high technology products, has been gaining ground in the world market-
place (8:1; 17:28). While the United States was cutting back on R&D,
three other major industrial nations were rapidly and continuously
increasing the total percentage of their gross national products that
they were plowing back into R&D for future growth (6:4). West Germany
and the Soviet Union both had surpassed the United States in the. amount
they were investing in R&D relative to their total gross national prod-
ucts three years ago. These foreign nations, respectively, spent 2.4
and 3.1 percent of their gross national products for R&D compared to
•
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the 2.3 percent expenditure in the United States. Japan spent about
1.9 percent of its gross national product for R&D in 1974. However, if
the previous five-year trend of Japan's increases in investments in R&D
has continued, then Japan probably surpassed the United States.in
1976 (6:4). Thus, the United States will have to increase its relative
investment in R&D in order to maintain its competitive position in
foreign trade.
There is another possible reason why America's technical inno-
vations have been slowing down. There are indications that both the
Government and private industry have been concentrating R&D on
near-term problems and achieving evolutionary advances, rather than
attempting to risk more time and effort to create major new innova-
tions (17). In fact, the average time from completion of an average
research project to final application dropped from about six years over
1960-1970 to only three years between 1970 and 1973 (6:79). Great
innovations tend to take more time to adapt for applications and to
gain acceptance than do evolutionary advances. Hence, recent trends
towards "relevance" and requirements for complete financial proofs of
the value of highly advanced long-term research may well be stifling
America's continued progress.
There has been considerable discussion regarding whether the
Federal Government should increase funding for basic research, applied
research, or development. Many authors argue that the appropriate
place for the Federal Government to provide support for the commercial
sector would be in basic and applied research, rather than for develop-
ment (for example, 8:38; 18; 19; 20:59). It is argued that there is a
tendency for commercial firms to invest most heavily in the later
stages of the R&D process where they can gain competitive advantages.
Industry is reluctant to invest in long-term'research because it is
risky, difficult to retain for themselves and, therefore, is not as
likely to yield commensurate profits (3:15; 8:51). Thus, the logic is
that the Government should invest in research because the returns may
often be far greater to an entire industry and to society than it could
be to any single company. The argument goes on to reject government
support of development activities, except where the Government is the
real customer for the products (19; 21). The Government is said to
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lack knowledge of the market and the motivation necessary to yield
economically viable products.
There is a school of thought that advocates government support
of certain development activities. Consider the many well-known
examples of federal support for development activities in the areas of
defense, space, housing, transportation, and nuclear energy. An argu-
ment can be made for government development programs where there
appear to be very great benefits to society as a whole, but where the
rewards may not appear great enough to any commercial firm t? warrant
large, unhedged, private investments.
The Federal Government continuously faces policy issues on
exactly what R&D should be done and who should do it. Every year the
executive and legislative branches of the Government must budget for
specific R&D programs. The Government must determine the priorities cf
\ '
these programs, based on where the greatest benefits to the nation can
be achieved. The use of federal laboratories to accomplish a portion
of this work versus use of the private sector .is an issue which has
arisen in many situations dating back to the early 1800's (V; 22).
AERONAUTICAL R&D
Aeronautics is a basic industry in the United States. The
importance of aeronautics to the economy is apparent from some
relatively simple statistics. Aeronautical products provide the
highest contribution to export sales of all U.S. manufactured goods'and*-
are exceeded only by agricultural produces (23:1). The United States
has manufactured over 80 percent of all the 'aircraft in operation by
airlines throughout the world today (24:20). The net favorable bal-
ance of trade in aeronautical products in 1974 amounted to about
$5 billion (6:25-26). Thus, aeronautics is vital to the relative
strength of the U.S. economy -and the soundness of the dollar.
Aeronautics has helped to alter the entire nature of America's
commercial and industrial activity. It has enhanced the diversifica-
tion and geographic dispersion of activities for a huge number of
American commercial firms, extending them to national and multi-national
.dimensions (25:4-7). It has broadened access to customers and
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suppliers for large and small firms in every industry. American
domestic airlines carry about 600,000 passengers a day. This figure is
expected to increase by 70 percent over the next ten years (26:223).
One can imagine the tremendous positive effects there must be on the
economy from the extensive commerce in goods and services conducted
daily by air travel. Although the effects on the economy have not been
measured, they may well be more significant to the economy than any
other factor concerned with aeronautics. However, there is also sub-
stantial economic activity directly in aviation. Aircraft sales in the
United States totaled $15 billion in 1975 and airline sales amounted to
another $15 billion (24; 27:12). Aeronautics currently provides over
one million direct jobs (23:1) and an undetermined number of secondary
jobs among a vast array of suppliers and related service industries.
The United States is highly dependent upon aeronautics for
defense. In fact, the Department of Defense purchased about 1,400
aircraft in 1975 at a cost of $7.2 billion, not including purchases of
armament for these aircraft (24:20,31). Indications are that future
advances and possibly even increased purchases of military aircraft and
air-breathing missies will be required in view of relative advances in
Soviet military might (28:40, 44,64-69). Aeronautics provides a major
part of the industrial foundation and financial support of the aero-
space industry, which also produces the nation's missies and space
<•'-;
products. The aerospace industry's products are as basic to the econ-
omy, prestige, and defense of the United States as ships were to the
great seafaring nations of earlier centuries.
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AERONAUTICAL R&D
Past federal support of aeronautical R&D has been mainly for
military purposes. The military first employed aeronautics during the
Civil War. The civilian Balloon Corps was used by the Union army for
battlefield observation and reconnaissance (1:127-128). The War
Department supported early experiments on powered aircraft flights
conducted by Samuel P. Langley around the turn of the century
(1:284-285). A number of government agencies conducted research in
aeronautics prior to World War I. However, the National Advisory
' . ' • - • - . ' . . - ' - . - . ' • - ' •
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Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)'was founded in 1915 and provided
focused research, advice, 2nd coordination needed to help boost
American aviation to the forefront among nations (1:283-287; 29; 30). . j
The Government's support of aeronautical R&D for military pur-
poses gave the United States its world-wide lead in both military and
civil aeronautics throughout the history of aviation (1; 31:6-27; 32).
The Federal Government sponsored 45 of the top 51 major technical
advances made in American aviation prior to 1972 (32:1). The Military
Services directly sponsored 70 percent of all these advances. Civil
aviation has relied primarily on military aeronautical R&D in the past "
to provide a technical basis and developments for commercial aircraft.
Table 1 on the following page shows that federal expenditures
for aeronautical R&D amounted to about $3 billion in 1976 (33). The
total government expenditure for aeronautics was only about 60 percent
of the nation's net export sales of aeronautical products in that year.
The federal investment in aeronautical R&D amounted to no more than -
15 percent of all the money expended by the Federal Government for
R&D (4:2; 24:93; 33). The Department of Defense provided 85 percent of
the Government's investment in aeronautical R&D. '
It is not difficult to understand why the Federal Government
must supply the bulk of funds for aeronautical R&D. The intensity of /
R&D required to produce the current rate of advances in an industry may
be measured by the cost of R&D as a percentage of industry sales. The
aircraft and missies industry expended an average of 21 percent of its ,j
net sales on R&D between 1961 and 1972 (6:93): This was the highest
percentage of R&D expenditures of any of the 15 major industry groups
in the United States. It was more than double the.: of the' next most /
R&D intensive group, which was the electrical equipment and communica- ?
tions industry (6:93). The aircraft and' misslas industry/itself ' / .' = :
invested 3.5 percent of its net sales in R&D vhicb was typical of all .;
high-technology industry groups. Thus, one could pot expect the a'/r- ;
craft and missies industry to provide more of its internal funds for
aeronautical R&D without substantially raising its prices to its
primary customers. Commercial sales prices are limited byworld-wi.de
competitive forces. The Federal Government was the prime customer
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for missle and space products and for over one-half of the total dollar
purchases of U.S. manufactured aircraft in 1975 (24:31). At' one end or
the other, the Federal Government, must pay for aerospace R&D to the
extent of roughly 16 percent or more of industry sales.
Table ]
Federal Expenditures in 1976 for Aeronautical R&D
Shown by Performing Institution
SEGMENT
OF R § D
COMMUNITY
ALL SEGMENTS
(Millions $)
MANUFACTURING
AND SERVICE
COMPANIES
NON-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS
UNIVERSITIES.
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL
WORK CATEGORY
BASIC
RESEARCH
$66
15%
2
30
53
100%
APPLIED
RESEARCH
$443
66%
2
6
26
100%
DEVELOPMENT
$1837
70%
2
2
24
100%
National Science Foundation estimates (33)
The aircraft and missiles industry is the most R&D-labor-
intensive industry in the United States. It was the second largest
employer of engineers and scientists in the United States in 1974,
which numbered 70",000 that year (5:10). There were about 90 engineers
for every 1,000 employees in the industry (6:93). This was more than
twice as large a ratio of engineers and scientists to employees as for
any of the other 14 major industry groups in the United States..
POOR
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CRISES IN AREONAUTICS
The aeronautics industry has been encountering serious prob-
lems. The difficulties are expected to grow more acute in the near
future unless current trends are reversed by the Government. The_JJJi.
Government has let the financial position and the rate of progress of
this basic industry slip very seriously over the last decade. j\n
intense national interest in space during the i960's sharply diverted
attention away from progress in aeronautics. The effects on aircraft
R&D programs became even more serious during the 1970's when increased
national concern over other social and economic problems resulted in a
general decline of interest in national defense or further advancement
of America's technological and industrial strengths. The employment
of engineers and scientists in the aircraft and missle industry dropped
28 percent from 1970 to 1975. This was four times greater than the
average decline of engineers and scientists in other manufacturing
industries (4:12). Thus, the federal withdrawal from R&D over the last
decade has hit the aerospace industry the hardest.
There is a general belief that aeronautics has become a mature
industry (34:1). The number of new aircraft prototypes greatly
declined over the last two decades. Between 50 and 70 new military
prototype aircraft, large and small, entered flight-testing every five
years from 1945 to 1960 (34). These figures do not include derivative
versions of earlier prototypes or any aircraft modification programs.
Many of the military development programs for transports, helicopters,
and even light utility aircraft were adapted by commercial manufac-
turers for civil aviation applications. The space program began in
1958. The number of new military prototype aircraft entering flight-
testing dropped, respectively, to 23, 12, and then 13 in each of the
following 5-year periods from 1960 to 1975 (34). This reduction was
blamed to a large extent on the escalating costs of military aircraft.
The reduction in military development programs and possible changes in
the nature of government-sponsored research may also have reduced the
impact of federal support on civil aeronautical advancements. .-.Civil
aircraft manufacturers developed several large wide-bodied jet trans-
ports specifically for commercial airlines in the early 1970's. These
>*-,;...'>-• 4-^ .^ 1 ^-i^  •&!;.
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engineering developments were based on earlier research and technology
advancements. However, there have been no new major civil aviation
development programs started in the last eight years (26:233).
At the same time, it is clear that many foreign, nations, with
government support, are continuing to accelerate the pace of their
aeronautical R&D programs for military and commercial applications
(23:2-3; 34). Foreign aeronautics industries have clearly stepped up
their attempts to capture a greater share of the world's aviation
markets (23:2). The Soviet Union has continued to obtain increasingly
greater advances in military and civil aircraft (28:40,44,46,47,60,
62-66; 34). American aeronautics may be approaching "maturity," but
one might well question how much of this maturity has been caused by a
failure to provide it sufficient emphasis or to do the right things.
There will be a huge demand for new civil aircraft transports
over the next 20 years. Estimates indicate that passenger travel will
probably grow at a compound rate from 6 to 8 percent per year and will
therefore roughly double during the next decade (35:6; 36:124). The
growth of air cargo is estimated at 5 percent annually (36:124). New
commercial aircraft will be required to meet this increase in demand,.
In addition, the airlines will need replacement aircraft with advanced
technology to. reduce noise, increase safety, cut pollution, and reduce
fuel costs. Replacement aircraft will be required. The useful life of
current equipment is estimated to be about 20 years; (36:119). The
average age of aircraft owned by U.S. trunk airlines plus Pan American
was calculated to be approximately 7.9 years in 1975 (35:6). It has
been estimated that U.S. trunk airlines and Pan American will require
new facilities and equipment amounting to a total of roughly •
$40 billion over the next eight years, $60-65 billion by 1990 (;35:6),
and $162 billion by the year 2,000 (36:119) Thus, the prospects for.
civil transport aircraft manufacturers would appear bright if it were
not for financial problems. ;
Unfortunately, the U.S. airline industry is not in a financial
position to raise capital to purchase such massive amounts of.new
equipment (35:7). The airline industry cannot provide deposits or
order guarantees to aircraft manufacturers to raise the capital .
'_J
<•!• "ff
required for new civil aircraft development programs. The difficulty
the airlines will have in financing $40 billion of new equipment over
the next eight years becomes clear when one realizes that the airlines
earned only about $1 billion in the prior seven years (35:6); This
industry is already too highly burdened with debt to be a good finan-
cial risk under current conditions. Twelve major airlines listed on
the New York and American stock exchanges, wliich are'tracked by Media - ;
General, had a composite long-term debt-to-equity ratio of 128 percent
in the 12 months prior to March, 1977 (37:24). This was higher than
90 percent of 1,500 major common stocks ranked by Media General (37:7).
Thus, the airlines would not appear to be a good financial risk unless
there is government support of some nature.
The Government has already been deeply involved in the down-
turn in aeronautics. In fact, there are claims that the Government- is
responsible for it (35:8). The profit margins of the airlines are
influenced by air fares which, are currently controlled through govern-
ment regulation. Air fares have been allowed to rise only 35 percent
over the last seven years, while the consumer price index has increased
| 86 percent (38:60). Regulated railroad fares were allowed to increase
| 100 percent during this same time period (38:60). The average after-
j tax profit margin of 12 major U.S. airlines listed by Media General was
1.7 percent of sales over a 12-month period prior to March, 1977
(37:74; 39:6). This ranks below 95 percent of 190 industry groups
. •' ranked by Media General (37:91). By way of comparison, the composite
profit margins of eight major regulated electric and gas utility
i groups, ranked by Media General, varied from 5.8 to 24 percent of
sales. The composite profit margin for 16 major rail roads-in the
Media General ranking was four times higher than for the airlines
(37:91). The composite return on equity of the 12 major airlines was
only about 6 percent and the return on total capital was only 2 percent.
The regulated utility groups had returns on equity and on total capital
that were roughly two to three times greater than the airline group
(37:75). Even the railroads had a composite return on total capital
that was 80 percent greater than the airline group (37:75-76). The
airlines have reportedly been accused of being inefficient by the head
. - . . .
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of the Civil Aeronautics Board, but the railroads have not yet been
' termed more efficient (37:91). The airlines currently face the possi-
! ; bility of g' ^rnment deregulation. They fear this will lead to an
j erosion of air fares under competitive pressures and increased diffi-
j culty in raising capital because of the withdrawal of government
j support (40).
j Aircraft manufacturers are also not in a ;s"trong financial
j condition. The large aircraft manufacturers are greatly dependent on
I .••-..' the Government for most of their income, which is derived primarily
from military aircraft, missies, and space products. The Government
holds a monopolistic position relative to these products. It is not
only the largest customer for these products, but it also controls all
foreign sales of them. In a market where there are multiple suppliers
and virtually only one customer, the Government, that customer has a
very large measure of control over his supp'^ers and their profits.
The Government can build or destroy the industry. The composite profit
margin over a 12-month period prior to March, 1977, for ten major
aerospace companies 1 istad on the New York Exchange was 2.6 percent of
sales (37:50). This percentage was less than the profit margins of
90 percent of the other 190 industry groups that were ranked by Media
General (37:91). The aerospace firms did have a return on equity that
Was average for the 1,500 companies compared (37:7,50). However, the.
industry faces huge capital requirements. The Milford committee of
! Congress pointed out that "The costs of developing new aircraft and
engines are approaching the net worth of individual manufacturers,
seriously inhibiting such projects" (23:2).
"• Members of Congress arid executive agencies are currently con-
;
 . sidering ways of increasing government support for U.S. airlines and
for aeronautical R&D programs (23; 35).. A substantial body of opinion
, favors such action (12; 23; 38; 41; 42; 43:41), but there are also
opposing viewpoints. Many members of Congress and the executive branch
favor removal' of supportive price regulation of the airlines (40).
These viewpoints are based on a Bureau of the Budget study that claimed
air fares have been too high. The expectation is that lower fares
would increase airline profits.by increasing the passenger volume.
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There is also a contention that aircraft manufacturers have earned
". . .rates of return on total investment on military aircraft
projects . . . substantially in excess of the level required to allow
these firms to attract capital" (18:11). Other opposing arguments are
that the Government has stimulated the demand side for new aircraft
through its regulatory powers and tax structure for depreciating com-
, mercial aircraft in use by the airlines (18:12). Arguments have also
been advanced that the Federal Government should not increase support
for any R&D and particularly, not for aerospace, because a decrease in
the demand side should result in a decrease in the federal funding
supply side (10). There are those who believe that aerospace firms
should be allowed to fail (10:272-273). Some authors have opposed
government support to the aircraft and missies industry for R&D based
on the fact that the extensive R&D required by this industry and for
the electrical equipment industry, which also receives substantial
federal support, are not reflected either in commensurate increases in
financial profits to these industries or increases in their produc-
tivity (11:217; 12). Most of these opposing arguments are clearly not
valid in view of the facts discussed earlier.
REGENT STUDIES ON AERONAUTICAL R&D
: /
Aeronautical R8D has been receiving more attention and
increased study during the decade of the 1970's. Recent studies have
addressed the impact of aeronautics on the nation's economy and wel-
fare, current problems and future prospects for civil aviation, the
contribution of military aeronautics to the progress of aviation, the
Government's role in regulation and support of aeronautics, projected
future aeronautical advancements, and the potential offer'ed by aero-
nautical R&D in specific technical areas (23; 25; 28; 32; 41; 42; 44;
45; 46). These studies recommended that various federal agencies sup-
port a considerable amount of research, technology advancement, and
development in aeronautics. A logical question then arises as to who
should conduct all this work for the Federal Government. This issue
has already surfaced as an intense topic of discussion in many previous
publications (for example, 41; 42; 45:Appendix B; 47 and elsewhere).
i 36
I1
Wide ranges of opinion have been expressed by various aeronautical R&D
leaders. However, there have been no prior systematic investigations
of rationale for government use of the various segments of the aero-
nautical R&D community or to reveal the relative strengths they each
have to offer.
AERONAUTICAL R&D INSTITUTIONS .-
* • ' ' : ' • • • ' V ' ' "' '
How important is it to understand the institutional structure
and relative strengths of the various segments of the aeronautical R&D
community? Donald M. HacArthur, Deputy Director of Research and
Technology in the Department of Defense, pointed out during House com-
mittee hearings in 1968 that it is not possible to examine even federal
laboratories in a meaningful way
. . . unless we place them in proper prospective, with respect :
to the other four types of performers we depend upon in the
DoD to accomplish our mission. . . . Each of these organiza-
tional types (industrial firms, universities, non-profit
institutions, and federal contract research centers) has a
relatively unique, although not mutually exclusive, role to
play in satisfying. DoD'requirements (48:3-4). •
One of his successors, John L. Allen, pointed out in 1974 that
. . .the differences between in-house laboratories, coruner-
cial industry, and the academic community lead to differences
in their capabilities that must be recognized and exploited •"'
for a maximally effective RDT&E [research and development! ".'''
process (49:3). J
An economist, Robert Gilpinr stated in a report for the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress in 1975 that
... [The] contrasts and differences among the various
types of R and D should be primary considerations in the
development of a national policy towards R and D; They ^
should determine the appropriate role of the various .,„-'
sectors of the R and D enterprise (university, government,
and industry). Unfortunately, ... too frequently the
comparative advantage of each sector has been neglected
in the fashioning of national policy for R and D (8:36-37).
Gilpen asserted that part of the reason for Britain's decline in tech-
nology has been that " . . . the British have failed to integrate suf-
ficiently the three estates of science and technology: universities',
government, and industry" (8:63). . • '.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR .QUALITY
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H. Guyford Stever, former Director of the National Science
Foundation and Science Advisor to the President, pointed but in a
paper submitted to Congress in 1976 that two of the four things that
Government must know in order to define an appropriate role of Govern-
ment in aeronautical research and development are
. . . (1) to understand the institutional structure of
the aviation industry, (2) to understand some charac- .
teristics of aeronautical R&D .... (50:430). '
Nevertheless, there has been no prior attempt to make a comprehensive
and systematic assessment of these factors relative to each other.
Serious questions already have been raised and many actions
taken in regard to the roles performed by various R&D institutions for
the Federal Government. They have all affected aeronautical R&D.
Congressional hearings and investigations in 1969-1970 questioned if it
was appropriate for manufacturing companies, primarily aerospace
firms, to receive government support for Independent Research and
Development (IR&D) (7:41-42). Legislation was proposed to eliminate
such support. In the early 1970's, many individuals on university
campuses attacked the role of universities in performing defense-
related R&D on university campuses. Subsequent actions by many
universities, and by Government itself, resulted in an alteration in
the character and extent of such activity in many fields. Proposals
were made by a Presidential commission in 1970 possibly to have pri-
vate contractors operate some Department of Defense in-house
laboratories (51:88). A later study in 1975 recommended that govern-
ment laboratories should be reduced about 15 percent from their 1974
levels (47). This recommendation was based on historical funding
relationships and policy decisions on the roles of government labora-
tories relative to the private sector. Substantial reductions in
government scientists and engineers began in 1975. Congressional
criticisms and pressures from other private firms led to questioning
the rationale behind the Department of Defense's use of captive
Federal Contract Research Centers, which are non-profit R&D institu-
tions (52). The Department of Defense substantially reduced its use
of this type of institution in 1976 (52:17).
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The Office of Management and Budget of the executive branch of
the Government has reportedly been exerting pressure on the Department
of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to
convert its in-house activities into contracts with the private sector
and to decrease the number of government personnel within these • •
agencies (53). The policies of the Office of Management and Budget
have long stipulated that cost should be the major factor in deter-
mining whether work is accomplished by the Government itself of under
contract (53; 54). But, is cost the only factor that differentiates
aeronautical R&D institutions in regard to conducting work for the
Government?
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF R&D INSTITUTIONS
Aeronautical R&D institutions may be divided into five
identifiable categories: manufacturing companies, service R&D compa-
nies, non-profit institutions, universities, and government labora-
tories (Appendix B, pages 174 to 176). However, does anything really
differentiate these types of organizations? After all, they can all
hire engineers, scientists, technicians, and machinists. An extensive
body of literature published in recent years shows that organizations
differ as a result of their internal and external environments (for
example, 55; 56; 57; 58). The internal environment includes organiza-
, tional structure, management style, work patterns, interactions
between organizational units, communications, personnel practices, and
•organizational development. The external environment consists of the
demands placed on the organizations by products and services required
by their markets, necessary interactions with customers and suppliers,
the nature of competition, the economy, governmental actions, community
relations, and such factors. ;
The contingency view of organization and management (for
example, 55; 59) stresses the importance of obtaining a three-way
match among the members' propensities, the internal environment, and
the external environment.. It has been shown that different types of
organizational climates and management methods are required in order to
conduct different kinds of work effectively. For example, Jay W. Lorsch
and John J. Morse (55) found that different management styles and vary-
ing degrees of feedback were necessary, depending upon the nature of
the work and the degree of uncertainty inherent in the external envi- |
ronment. In research organizations the external environment is highly
uncertain. The most effective research laboratories, were found to be
those utilizing less structured organizations, less emphasis on com-
munications, slower feedback, and more participative management styles.
The exact reverse was'found to be.true for effective manufacturing
organizations where the external environment was highly certain and the
nature of the people was different than in the research organizations.
It therefore requires different types of organizations and management
methods to best accomplish different types of work.
The R&D institutions in the United States have developed dif-
ferent internal organizational climates to fit their situations.
Studies by Howard N. Vollrcer (57), Albert Shapero, and others (58) at
Stanford Research Institute have revealed extensive categorical dif-
ferences among the internal environments of government laboratories,
universities, non-profit institutions, contract research centers, and (
industrial establishments. However, Vollmer (57) presented evidence j
that the internal environments sometimes even differ among the same |
types of R&D institutions in different industries. Thus, it is^ |
important to relate roles of R&D institutions to a specific industry, |
because the results may not hold true for other industries. f
There are clearly different external environments for all of |
the institutions engaged in aeronautical R&D. Universities basically ]
are engaged in education and must be responsive to the students' needs f
and time schedules. Manufacturing companies depend primarily upon the |
sale of their products and must be responsive to the market and their |
stockholders. Service R&D companies are not dependent upon sales of j
manufactured products and therefore must address their efforts mainly • \
to the market for their technical services. They are also under • |
pressures from their stockholders to produce profits. No.n-profit R&D j
institutions have very similar external environments to those of the 1
service R&D companies except they do not have to.show a profit for f
stockholders. Some non-profit R&D institutions, called Federal ' |
. . . . . - .\ : - . : . , . ; • ; . - ; " • . . . - , . • • ' . 4
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Contract Research Centers, are partially or totally captive organize- '•?
tions of the Government. They are under less competitive pressures
than other organizations in the private sector. Government labora-
tories do not operate in situations that are as competitive as those ,
for R&D organizations in the private sector. In fact, government
laboratories control a substantial portion of the funds expended pry.." •
research and technology in the private sector. However, each of these :
groups must coordinate with and be responsive to their customers. The '
possible degrees of coordination and types of interactions with their
customers are different for the various R&D institutions. Hence, there
are obvious dissimilarities in the external environments as well as in
the internal environments of the institutions engaged in aeronautical
R&D and one might expect that these factors will influence their work.
PRIOR STUDIES ON STRENGTHS OF R&D INSTITUTIONS
There have been no comprehensive systematic studies to examine
the relative strengths of aeronautical R&D institutions and to examine
underlying rationale for government use of particular institutions.. . :
Vollmer (57) conducted a study in 1965 during which he sampled scien-
. tists and research managers and obtained a cross-evaluation of the
relative prestige of several segments of the R&D community. This study ; .
;also presented data on the willingness of different types of organiza- ;<
tions to communicate their results outside their own organizations.
.'. VolImer's investigation sampled the aerospace industry, but it was ' \\ '•
limited to people in the fields of biology, chemistry, mathematics, and /•
physics, which were not representative of the major technical disci- / : ;
plines in the field of aeronautics (60). ; ;
In 1970 E. M. Glass reported peer ratings for laboratories in ; ;
the Department of Defense (56:13). The relative performance of: these / ;
laboratories was assessed by comparing the input to the laboratories /.. .'
relative to their output. The input to the laboratories was expressed ;
in terms of funds, equipment, and property. The output was assessed •
from the peer ratings, papers, and patents. This investigation of DOD ;
laboratories did not obtain any comparisons related to any other segment
of the R&D community. It also did not compare ODD laboratories relative
to their work in aeronautics.
'
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The Department of Defense carried out an assessment of military
service laboratories from 1974 to 1975, during which it conducted a
survey only among members of the DOD staff (47:c-l to c-12). The sur-
vey provided data on the staff's opinion regarding whether more or less
work in specific technical areas should be done under contract or in
DOD laboratories. It determined the staff's attitude regarding the
quality of work conducted by DOD laboratories for categories from
research through development. As part of the investigation", the Air
Force surveyed 17 internal Air Force "customers" for Air Force labora-
tory products. Data were reportedly obtained regarding the competence,
responsiveness, and objectivity of laboratory personnel in relation to
categorically similar organizations outside the Air Force (47:24).
The Department of Defense laboratory utilization study presented com-
prehensive data on personnel, contracting trends, and a very broad
specturm of Department of Defense activities. This study presented DOD
rationale for use of various R&D institutions. However, it did not
assess the relative strengths of all the segments of the R&D community
as they might be viewed from vantage points outside the Government.
A Department of Defense task force conducted a study of
non-profit Federal Contract Research Centers in 1976 (52). Survey
questionnaires were submitted to nine such centers operating under the
Department of Defense. The task force conducted interviews with
people in these centers and in sponsoring organizations. The results
were discussed in the final report of the task force but the data were
not reported. Furthermore, this study essentially focused on a single
segment of the R&D community. .The study did not .evaluate the roles of
the other R&D institutions or assess attitudes in the other institu- ;
tions regarding their relative strengths for conducting work for the i
Federal Government. . . |
fA NASA committee conducted an interesting study from 1975 to !
1976 entitled "The NASA Outlook for Aeronautics""(45). Among many other j
things, it sought to define NASA's mission in aeronautical research, ; \
technology, and development (45:Appendix B). The committee-obtained |
outside viewpoints by personal interviews, letters, and surveys cover- |
ing 38 industrial organizations, 9.leaders in universities, 10 leaders • '• |
j
. • . . • • - . - • • • • . . 1
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at headquarters level in the Department of Defense, and leaders from
6 other governmental agencies in Washington. The NASA committee
interpreted and presented general consensus statements of the comments
and also ranges of opinion. This investigation provided useful infor-
mation on how various other organizations and outside leaders viewed
NASA's role in aeronautics. The committee then formulated Its own
view of NASA's role in aeronautical R&D.
The earlier investigation into roles for NASA revealed the reed
to address the NASA laboratories within the total context of all the
nation's aeronautical R&D institutions. In addition, it appeared
necessary to move the inquiry into the realm of quantitative determina-
tions of such subjective judgments in order to gain more specific
information on the extent and intensity of the opinions of aeronautical
R&D leaders. It was clear that more highly structured techniques u
would be needed to examine intrinsic strengths, uncover supporting
rationale, and evaluate the roles of all aeronautical R&D institutions i ""„A
relative to carefully defined categories of work. - A/If.
CURRENT INVESTIGATION '•
The spec-i-li.c purpose of the current investigation was to deter- - „.
mine what r^ |£tionsJy.ps.,_i/_a.r^ j^K<is_t_ajiT^  the relative strengths of ?
the nation's aeronautical R&D institutions in regard to conducting
aeronautical R&D for the Federal Government. It was conceived to pro-
vide comprehensive, quantitative evaluations of rationale for every
segment of the aeronautical R&D community, as viewed by leaders from '
all of these institutions. Special methodology was devised to surface
and cross-evaluate relevant rationale. The investigation could not
logically be confined within the usually desirable constrictions of
testing a relatively small number of discrete hypotheses. The results
are therefore extensive in nature. They can be used as a virtual hand-
book of judgments for specific problems in a wide variety of pertinent
issues. The information obtained in this investigation should be used
in formulating government policy on aeronautical R&D. The results also
can be employed by aeronautical.,R&D organizations, in the public and
private sectors, in formulating long-range goals and strategic plans.
•'
i * - - • ' . " ' ' • • •
Chapter 3
. • ; • " . ' - METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this investigation was to determine what rela-
tionships, if any, exist among the relative strengths of government
laboratories, manufacturing companies, service R&D companies,
non-profit R&D institutions, and universities in regard to conducting
applied research, basic research, technology advancement, and develop-
ment in aeronautics for the Federal Government. A total of 25 of the
nation's leaders in aeronautical R&D was selected from among the H
members of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. J
. ' fr
Five leaders were selected from each of the segments of the aeronau- f
tical R&D community to provide equal weighting to judgments on . "- =
rationale that supported each segment. Analysis methods were devised
to reveal the degree of agreement among leaders within each group, :
between specific groups, and for the total sample of all 25 partici- |
pants. . ' . • / '
 ( ' ; |
The investigation was divided into two parts. The first part ; ; |
consisted of a survey questionnaire to obtain judgments on factors ; 'I
that were hypothesized as being important, lent themselves well to ./; : I
written survey questionnaires, and were not appropriate to conference • |
discussions. T h e second part o f t h e investigation consisted o f a i f
. : ' . ' : ' • 3
workshop. In the workshop, the participants had the opportunity to . '|
introduce and cross-evaluate rationale for government use of each type ,' S
of aeronautical R&D institution. The workshop employed a new con- ; • |
ferencing technique that used successive evaluations by homogeneous |
sub-groups, mixed sub-groups, and individuals. The technique was / ; 4
devised during this investigation in order to stimulate discussion, . ' \ |
improve communications, and extract quantitative information on group
 : j
consensus judgments on highly controversial topics. The technique was ' j
~"~i
formulated to secure subjective judgments from groups that have -.|-
• ' ' . ' • • ' • ' " ' 1
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intrinsically competitive objectives, unequal power over each other,
and a degree of mutual dependence. •
DEFINITIONS
Definitions present a major problem in obtaining subjective
judgments of the strengths of the various sectors of the aeronautical
R&D community and rationale that tend to support government use;of
those institutions. The various strengths hypothesized in the survey
questionnaire and those that emerged from rationale obtained during the •
workshop are operationally defined,'respectively, by the questions pre-
sented in the questionnaire (pages 178-188), the statements made in the
workshop (Tables 10 through 32), and the related measurements.
ORGANIZATIONS \ \
There are three general types of organizations defined in this
publication which are involved directly or indirectly in aeronautical
R&D.
Aeronautical R&D institutions. The terms segments of the \
aeronautical R&D community and aeronautical R&D institutions have . j
>
identical meanings. They refer to organizations that actually conduct |
original aeronautical R&D for the Federal Government. These organiza- ;
tions were divided into five relatively homogeneous groups: manufac-
turing companies (Man Cos), service R&D companies (Serv Cos),
non-profit R&D institutions (Non-Profs), universities (Univs), and
government laboratories (Gov Labs). They are defined in Appendix B on
page 174. The essential differences in the definitions of these insti- .
tutions stem from variations in their principal products, services, and
ownership structures. It is important to note that the terms govern-
ment laboratories and NASA laboratories refer only to original,
in-house, aeronautical R&D conducted by these laboratories.
Government test centers. The primary tasks of government test
centers are to conduct ground and airborne tests for other organiza-
tions. They perform relatively little original aeronautical R&D other ; ' .
than developing testing facilities.
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Government funding organizations. The government funding
organizations conduct little or no original R&D. They are management
organizations that provide funds to the performing institutions.
Appendix B contains a definition of this type of organization on
page 175. Government funding organizations would include such organi-
zations as system project offices (SPO's), the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research, or any.organization that simply!contracts for and
guides work. However, they would also include organizations, at
higher government levels, that provide R&D funds to government labora-
tories.
ALLOCATION OF EXPENDITURES
Government contract expenditures that are principally to help
government laboratory personnel conduct original R&D were attributed
to the government laboratories (Appendix B, page 174). All expendi-
tures under government contracts to other institutions were attributed
to the institutions that conducted the original R&D, even in cases
where the government laboratories issued the contracts. Government
funds for Independent Research and Development (IR&D) and the resultant
efforts by private firms were not included within the scope of this
investigation. These funds fall under the discretionary control of the
firms that receive them. These firms use the government funds for IR&D
in much the same manner as they invest their own internal funds, which
also were not considered in this investigation.
CATEGORIES OF WORK ;
The aeronautical R&D process was divided into four categories
of work: basic research, applied research, technology advancement,
and development. These categories are defined by the objectives used
to justify the work and the technical nature of the work. The aeronau-
tical R&D process actually consists of a continuous spectrum of over-
lapping activities that extend from basic research through final
product development. The nature of the work and the. information
required to do it vary markedly from one end of the spectrum to the
other. In general, the breadth of the objectives diminishes and the
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investments increase as activities progress from basic research to
final product development (4:6; 44:50). Nevertheless, it is highly
desirable to create logical definitions of categories of work to
describe the steps in the R&D process.. They are very useful for man-
agement, planning, and budgetary purposes. The definitions used in
this investigation are presented in Appendix B, pages 174 to 176.
Immense problems and misunderstandings have been created by a
proliferation of meanings of terms commonly used to divide the R&D
process into various categories. The American Institute of Aeronau-
tics and Astronautics published a report in 1975 which contained an
excellent discussion and comparison of 13 current sets of definitions.
This publication includes six official sets of definitions used by dif-
ferent government agencies (44:49-54). Figure 1 illustrates the rela-
tionships between the current definitions (Appendix B) and two other
logical sets of definitions frequently used by the Federal Government.
DEPARTMENT .
OF U _
DEFENSE ' BASIC
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT
(6.1) <6.2)
,, *,
EXPLORATORY 'ADV..
DEVELOPMENT DEV, DEVELOPMENT
(6.4)
NATIONAL
SCIENCE
FOUNDATION ' BASIC " APPLIED
RESEARCH RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT
CURRENT
DEFINITIONS ' BASIC " APPLIED " TECHNOLOGY "DEVELOPMENT"
RESEARCH RESEARCH ADV.,
Figure 1: Definitions in the R&D Spectrum
Notation (4:6; 44:50) means Reference 4: page 6 and
Reference 44: page 50.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITV
Substantial conrouni cat ions problems result from the many terras -
used in Government to describe its categories of R&D. No official
published set of definitions far the categories of work used by NASA
for its aeronautics programs could be located for this study. It also
was not possible to determine from NASA's in-house and contract work,
conducted under these NASA categories, how the categories related to
the spectrum of work shown in Figure 1. A Senate staff report in 1976
also noted that "It is difficult to gauge the extent of NASA's work in
basic aeronautics using the current budget breakdown" (53:23). This
problem is also reflected in much of the literature on NASA's aeronau-
tics programs which interchangeably use the terms "research,"
"research and technology base," "technology," and "R&D." Department of
Defense officials have also often used the term "technology" inter-
changeably with "applied research," "R&D," and "development."
Organizations in both agencies have used hybrid terms to describe
similar things. Experimental aircraft built just to test aeronautical
innovations or gain experience in new flight regimes have often been
called technology demonstrators, hardware demonstration programs,
concept demonstration programs, demonstration aircraft, experimental
prototypes, research vehicles, or research aircraft. Here the words
"research," "technology," and "experimental" often are used inter-
changeably. From these terms, it might appear that the efforts fall at
1 different points in the R&D spectrum (Figure 1). The current set of
| definitions on pages 175 to 176 place such programs well within the
| I technology advancement portion of the spectrum and often toward the
1 • development end of it. Hence, definitions of the categories of work
• ;• present a difficult problem in discussing aeronautical R&D for the
f Federal Government.
' '
; • Y PARTICIPANTS
"^  ' '. '
' • ' / ' * ' -
I A total of 25 aeronautical R&D leaders was selected from. among
4 the membership of the American Institute of. Aeronautics and Astronau-
I tics. Five participants were selected from each of the five segments
I . of the aeronautical R&D community. This selection was made to obtain
| equal weighting of points of view from each of the five types of
•.•jii«.Mg&A.i'J;
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aeronautical R&D institutions. The participants and their organiza-
tions are listed on pages vii and viii. Profiles of the participants'
backgrounds and a description of the author's background are presented
in Appendix A on pages 166 to 171.
The following criteria were used by the author in selecting
each participant: '
1. Leadership—prime R&D management position in an
aeronautical R&D institution and/or an outstanding
reputation for original aeronautical R&D.
2. Views on subject—unknown to author and sponsor.
3. Institutional affiliation—equal representation.
4. Organizational affiliation—representative sample of
technical products and services.
5. Geographical location—national dispersion.
The author was acquainted with only three of the participants prior to
the study. Their views on the subject were not known.
There were four problems regarding the representation that may
have had some influence on the results of this investigation. First,
the leaders from the non-profit R&D institutions actually represented
two separate factions. Some leaders came from non-profit institutions
that were captive organizations to the Government and others came from
more independent organizations. Observations from the workshop
revealed some tendency for these two groups to differ because of'their
contrasting situations. Second, one representative in the non-profit
group came from an organization primarily engaged in space activities,
although he previously had been known for his work in aeronautics.
. Third, the representation from government laboratories included mem-
bers of all the major government agencies in aeronautical R&D except
the Federal Aviation Agency. This omission probably made a difference
in regard to government civil-aviation R&D activities which deal with
airline traffic, airports, and safety. Fourth, there were no represen-
tatives from the helicopter industry, although there was an Army
representative familiar with helicopter technical problems.
Some caution is also warranted in regard to possible misinter-
pretations of the results of this investigation. Most of the partici-
pants came from particularly high levels of management in aeronautical.
I
i
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RS.D organizations (pages vii and viii). Their judgments may not neces-
sarily have been representative of lower level engineers, scientists,
or managers in aeronautical R&D. For example, Vollmer (57) reported
considerable differences, in many cases, between viewpoints expressed
by researchers and those given by research managers. There also could
have been differences between the participants' judgments and those of
younger, less-experienced engineers and scientists. The views
expressed by all participants, as a group, also may not have been
representative of those that would have been obtained by proportional
representation from each segment of the aeronautical R&D community.
CONVENTIONAL ADVISORY AND CONFERENCE MECHANISMS
Government and private organizations engaged in aeronautical
R&D have sophisticated techniques for conducting R&D. However, they
tend to use conference and advisory group methods that are old,
simplistic, and often ineffective. The most common method is the
group "meeting," which approximates the open forum of the ancient
Greek civilization. In a forum, a group may arrive at a consensus by
voting in Greek citizen style or the chairman might make a decision in
the manner of the early kings. There are common hybrid versions of
these two group decision processes that are commonly used in the aero- ; •
nautical R&D community. One or two people may prepare written sum- ;
maries of group consensus judgments, which might be altered by members.
of the group or higher authorities. This method does not convey the i
extent of .agreement or disagreement among the members of the group. ;;
Important information can also be lost in the process of interpretation. ..
Open forums have been plagued by many well-known defects that
can lead to poor communications and faulty decisions (61:6,86; 62:1; /
63:177 to 190; 64). They include domination by strong eloquent ,
i* - " (i
personalities,, public conflicts triggering rebuttal-oriented listening, . i
embarrassments of publically revising positions, majority pressures, • '\ • f
interference from irrelevant material, over-politeness,/authoritarian . •
manipulation by organizers or chairmen, personal perils of free
speech, pecking order communications, and imprecise methods of . . i
establishing a group consensus.
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The approaches advocated for improving conference communica- .|
tions and group decisions fall into two categories. They either | .
attempt to improve human behavior (for example, 65; 66) or they attempt .;i
to improve the basic structure of the conference method (61; 63;- 64). j
Perhaps the greatest potential is offered by seeking ways to improve | I
the conferencing structure since human behavior is extremely difficult | j
to change on a large scale. Some prior methods have yielded improve- \ -\
ments in the structure of open forums in appropriate situations. They \]
include brainsterming, sub-group discussions, posting, and others (64;
67). However, many of the major problems associated with open discus-
sions best can be solved by providing a degree of anonymity. Secret
balloting has been used to improve decisions at the end of open forums.
Closed executive sessions :have also been used by government advisory
groups. However, the closed vote at the end of an open forum does not
aid the early part of the communication process and a closed executive
session is merely an open forum with more limited participation.
Written survey questionnaires have been used to provide strict
anonymity, reduce irrelevant communications, and increase economy (68;
69). This relatively old and useful method of gathering opinions is
limited by the fact that it provides only one channel of communication.
It does not allow the participants themselves to exchange information,
ideas, and viewpoints in order to explore and upgrade judgments. The
survey questionnaire is also subject to many possible errors in con-
struction including omission, vagueness, ambiguity, and biased wording.
The impersonal surveyrquestionnaire technique provided the
foundation of the Delphi method which was invented, not by the early
Greeks, but by the Rand Corporation around 1950. The Delphi method has
hundreds of variations but they all basically provide for anonymous
communications by the use of successive rounds of questionnaires (61).
After each round, the participants receive the results summarized in
statistical form and perhaps written information from the responses.
The participants may then modify their views after rethinking the situa-
tion. This procedure has been found to lead towards a convergence of
group opinions. The Delphi method has been criticized severely for its '
high participant dropout rates, tendency to produce conformance to '
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majority opinion, lack of proof of validity, and loss of group creativ-
ity that might be possible through personal interactions (67). There
were other criticisms attributed to the Delphi method that were no more
than incorrect applications of analysis methods, sampling procedures,
statistical techniques, and reporting requirements (67). They were not
fundamental to the basic characteristics of the Delphi method as a con-
ferencing technique. „ ,
SEGMENT ANALYSIS
The methods used in this investigation were 'cjr.^ -.-ucted to pro-
vide quantitative information on the points of view of"i.'ne leaders from
each of the segments of the aeronautical R&D communi*:.1/ and the combined
opinions of all 25 participants. In a criticism rt \>ast use of expert
opinion, H. Sackman suggested that all future metres should employ
techniques that allow identification of sub-groups and analysis of -
their opinions (67:26). Sackman cited prior studies for the Government
where extensive group biases were suspected, but which were difficult
to trace because of the methods employed. Many people in Government
expect advisory groups to be above biases. One published study
reported that advisory groups composed of members of certain Air Force
aeronautical R&D organizations were completely objective in giving
advice in a Delphi study (70). This study supposedly showed that they
even provided judgments contrary to the goals of their* own organiza-
tions. The proof given left some room for doubt because the impacts
on future organizational goals were not carefully identified and the
statistical significance of the comparisons was not computed.
The current investigation employed segment analyses for several
reasons. It was hypothesized that leaders from the same types of aero-
nautical R&D institutions would tend to have common views regarding the
relative strengths of all segments of the aeronautical R&D community.
Another hypothesis was that many of these views would be shared by
leaders from all the aeronautical R&D institutions. If the segment
analyses showed this to be true for certain opinions, then these view-
points might be accepted as postulates. However, aeronautical leaders
from the different institutions were also expected to disagree on many
of these issues. In these cases, the segment analyses would provide
1 the opportunity to select the set of "advisors" that seemed most
: - likely to have made the best judgments. In addition, the sub-group
analyses would reveal sub-group viewpoints that might explain reasons
for different attitudes that one might encounter'In dealing with people
from these institutions in the future. *•>•=-
o .SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE • ;^
A survey questionnaire was prepared and mailed to all 25 aero-
nautical leaders prior to the workshop. The questionnaire is given in
Appendix C, pages 178 to 188. It included institutional strengths that
were hypothesized as being significant but which did not lend them-
selves well to discussion at the workshop. The survey questionnaire
started the participants' thinking about the problem and the related
definitions.- However, the results were not fed back to the partici-
pants nor was the survey discussed during the workshop. The intent was
to limit the impact of the questionnaire on the workshop. The partici-
pants completed matrices on funding in the questionnaire and at the end
of the workshop (Appendix C, pages 187 and 188).
The questionnaire was prepared in about two months. It was
' completely rewritten seven times and was pre-tested on six engineers,
a secretary, and a housewife. The estimated time to complete it was
45 minutes. A total of 22 participants returned the completed ques-
tionnaires by mail before the workshop, as requested.; These question-
narres were anonymously returned, identified only by segment of the
aeronautical R&D community, The other three participants personally
handed m the completed questionnaires at the start of the workshop.
. WORKSHOP AND TRIBUTARY TECHNIQUE ;
The tributary technique was devised to provide a conference
structure for the workshop. The technique was designed to establish a
flow of information somewhat similar to the way that tributaries I
develop from their own sources, successively interact with other•'tribu-
taries, mix in rivers, and flow into the oceans. The technique was
devised for conferences where the participants belonged to organizations
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that did have an overall common objective, where there were various
degrees of mutual dependence among sub-groups. However, the technique
was most specifically <isaigned for situations where these groups had,
at the same time, strongly diverse, conflicting, and often competitive
objectives. It was for high-threat environments where many partici-
pants might initially feel that individual free speech could adversely
impact their own organizations. The technique was devised for diffi-
cult topics that require^ exploration, examination, and highly subjec-
tive judgments by qualified people. It was for topics that required
clear consensus judgments by groups, rather than possibly divergent
individual innovations.
PRINCIPLES OF TRIBUTARY TECHNIQUE
The tributary technique was based on nine main principles
related to group dynamics.
Interesting group discussions. The tributary technique was
devised for group discussions combined with impersonal communications,
as opposed to the completely impersonal approach used in.the Delphi
method. The reportedly massive dropout rates .in the Delphi process are
indicative of frustration or a loss of interest (67:52). In such
cases, one cannot control the type or extent of participation. The
current method was devised to create an exciting atmosphere. There is
reason to believe that people think and work best under such conditions.
Prior studies indicated that small groups, of about six members, with
internally free discussions were most likely to reach consensuses
(64:193). This concept was found to be valid, independent of the skill
of the leaders. These prior studies indicated thafc periods of 20 to 30
minutes for intense group discussions were best, although1 some discus-
sion methods dealt with brief topics in only 6 minutes (64).
Highly structured steps. The tributary technique provided a
very highly structured conference. In fact, the conference structure
was used to replace the role usually assumed by a chairman. Neither
the author nor the sponsor had any control whatsoever over the par-
ticipants' activities within the framework of the conference structuie.
The expectation was that the conference structure would also increase
participant teamwork, reduce interference from extraneous material,
• .- 54- . ' • • • . . '
Increase efficiency, and increase the participants' satisfaction. Some
earlier studies indicated that groups are, in general, more satisfied
with conferences that have a good deal of procedural structuring, or
control, than they are with meetings that are less orderly (64).
.Graduated tasks. The entire process was divided into a series
of graduated tasks in order to help the participants progressively make
more difficult decisions. The tasks and the goals were carefully
defined for each set of discussions. The results at the end of each
stage were self-contained and logically complete. The interaction
process was planned so that every group's output, at every stage, was
rapidly reviewed by a peer group. The members of each group had the
| ability and the power.to make decisions and complete their tasks at
] each stage of the process. Earlier studies in group dynamics indicated
I that group productivity increases when the participants know that they
jj have the power to resolve the problem that they are given (64).
! Rethinking and feedback. The procedures were devised to give
| each participant up to three chances to change decisions. A partici-
f pant could alter his decisions each time without anyone else realizing
I that he was revising his position. The rethinking process was also
I • - . designed to contribute to the participants' thought processes and to
•ji allow them tO'move on to increasingly difficult decisions. This proce-
- dure was expected to yield a convergence in viewpoints. There was some
prior evidence from a Delphi study that just rethinking decisions
V played a strong part in the convergence process that took place in the
Delphi method (62). Feedback was also used in the .tributary technique.
- All conference methods make headway by providing feedback in some form.
The tributary technique was structured to yield timely and complete
feedback on sub-group consensus viewpoints. > " '
- * , - . . *
Time pressure. The time for each step purposefully was: set at
a level that would create pressures on the groups. Studies at the
' .
University of Michigan on group dynamics have shown that "The more
' ' •
urgent the problems, the more productive the group" (64:63).
' Graduated confrontation. The conference was structured to
.limit direct confrontations between participants from dissimilar
groups, until all homogeneous groups had an opportunity to carefully'
consider all viewpoints. A series of steps provided indirect communi- " •
cation between homogeneous groups prior to mixed group meetings. //
Constructive competition. The idea was to channel the natural /
sense of competition into constructive contributions. The tributary -
technique was based solely on positive inputs followed by quantitative /
evaluations of those inputs. Each sub-group was to be challenged, by /
a sense of competition, to improve on the inputs of other groups. /;
/ :
Anonymity. The intent was to increase the freedom to comraurii-/
cate by submerging individual judgments in homogeneous sub-group /
opinions. The maximum threatening exposure was in mixed group meeti'ngs
that followed homogeneous sub-group meetings. However, in the mixed
group meetings, each participant had the option of impersonally stating
viewpoints as the opinions that came out of his homogeneous group
meetings. ,,,-/ :
Quantitative output. The tributary technique was devised to
provide complete quantitative output on group consensus judgments at
the end of every phase of the process. Groups and individuals had to
make quantitative decisions which provided focus and task-oriented
behavior.
TECHNIQUE DEVELOPMENT AND PREPARATIONS
The tributary technique was designed in conceptual form. The
process was planned for five homogeneous sub-groups considering four
categories of work. The entire workshop was to be limited to a single
day.
Test groups. A model of the tributary technique was devised
to test the whole process by using two homogeneous groups and two cate-
gories of work. The model workshop was conducted with five .partici-
pants from one government laboratory and five participants from a
service R&D company. The participants in the test groups v/ere inter-
viewed, as a group and individually, after the model workshop.
Information was obtained from the test groups on the time required to
complete the tasks, the clarity of the instructions, communications :
difficulties, individual attitudes, and the efficiency of the proce- ;
dures. The tributary technique and its implementation were substan-. ;
tially modified based upon this information. . . . . : i
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Training the workshop observers. The day before the conference,
five observers were instructed on their functions. Each group discus-
sion session in the conference was to have one observer and one
recorder. The observer's functions were to enter formulations of ten-
tative group viewpoints on a blackboard, comment on clarity of the
statements, transfer group decisions to a flip chart, keep the group on
time, and interpret procedures. The observers were instructed not to
participate in the discussions in .any manner nor attempt to act as
meeting chairmen. They were shown how to handle potential difficulties
that had arisen in the earlier test-group sessions. They rehearsed all
procedures during practice sessions. The observers were as follows:
Stephen H. Achtenhagen
Professor
School of Business
San Jose State University
William Brickner
Stewart E. Fliege
Professor
School of Business and Management
Pepperdine University
Dennis D. Schiffel
Group Leader
Effects of Public Policy on SST
National Science Foundation
Professor
School of Business
San Jose State University
John R. Chirichiello
Associate Director
Industry Studies
National Science Foundation
None of the observers had ever worked in the field of aeronautics nor
had they ever had any affiliations with orgar 'zations engaged in aero-
nautical R&D.
OPENING SESSION
The agenda followed during the workshop is given in Appendix C
on pages 189 to 191. The author took 10 minutes of the opening session
to review and discuss a list of definitions which were distributed as
handouts (Appendix B, pages 174 to 176). The roles of the observers in
the sub-group sessions were explained. The participants were informed
that no judgments would be traceable to individual.'. It was considered
very important not to reveal the entire process in advance which might
have interfered with sequential decisions and biased group actions.
Only the procedures and tasks for the homogeneous sub-group sessions
were outlined at the opening session.
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HOMOGENEOUS GROUP SESSIONS
The participants were divided into five ' tb-groups. Each
sub-group consisted of representatives of a single segment of the
aeronautical R&D community. The homogeneous sub-groups met in
U separate rooms. .,
|j Rationale development; self-justification. Each sub-group was
asked to indicate, on a flip chart, as many as four primary reasons why
the Federal Gox'ernment should use its type of R&D institution to con-
duct each category of aeronautical R&D. In other words, each sub-group
would submit a maximum of 16 self-generated statements of rationale why
the Government should use its type of institution to conduct all four
categories of work from basic research through development. Each
statement of rationale wa-s to be a sentence that contained a single
reason. The statements of rationale did not have to be unique to just
one institution or a single category of work. The same rationale
§ could be applied to more than one aeronautical R&D institution and to
p multiple categories of work. Tentative statements were first formu-
j| lated on a blackboard. The observer transferred a final statement tot * • - ' • - • - -
i| . the flip chart when three or more of the five sub-group members agreed
|3 with it (for example, see Appendix C, page 192. The recorder then
entered the rationale statements on a hand-held form (Appendix C,
: page 193. The time allotted for the first session was 1 hour.
Rotation, review, and expansion of rationale. The sub-groups
then sequentially rotated rooms for each of the following sessions.
1 The same room was always used for consideration of rationale related to
1 ' the R&D institution whose representatives had originally^occupied the
H room. The observers, recorders, and flip charts remained in their
j| original rooms. Hence, each reviewing group read the rationale state-
§ ments left on the flip chart by the prior groups. The first task
f e s . ' • • • • • ' • . • • ;
p assigned to each review group was to enter on the flip chart, new
|| statements that either supported, clarified, or corrected rationale for
•|f government use of the R&D institution that had initially occupied the
p{ room. The review group was not permitted to physically alter the pre-
|j vious statements appearing on the chart or to enter negative state-
e? ments. The process used by each reviewing group in formulating,
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agreeing upon, and recording the new rationale was exactly the same as
had been used in the initial session. Next, the reviewing group again
examined the. previous rationale to determine if it considered'any of
the rationale to be completely invalid. When four out of five members
of a review group agreed upon such a judgment, the recorder then noted
it by placing a blackball (o) on the hand-held rationale sheet
(Appendix C, page 193). The recorder also noted which homogeneous
group entered each statement of rationale by using a plus (+). This
information did not appear on the flip chart and was not available to
the reviewing groups during these homogeneous group sessions. There
was only one round of rotation. Therefore, none of the homogeneous
sub-groups had an opportunity, during these sessions, to see any of the
new rationale entered on its original flip chart. The single-round
approach was used in order to avoid concerns of competitive counter- ,
actions that might have followed the first round of reviews. However,
the one-round approach meant that none of the sub-groups could evaluate
all of the new rationale entered by all reviewing groups on the flip
charts of every other R&D institution. The time allowed for each
review session was 25 minutes. The observers indicated that perhaps 10
additional minutes should have been allowed for the last session
because of a substantial accumulation of rationale statements.
FEEDBACK ON RATIONALE
The rationale statements and judgments from all the prior homo-
geneous sub-group sessions were next distributed to all participants.
This distribution was accomplished by reproducing the accounts main-
tained by the recorders on the hand-held rationale sheets (Appendix C,
page 193). The participants were next given instructions, in a general
session, for the mixed group sessions which followed.
MIXED GROUP MEETINGS
The participants were then divided into five mixed groups.
Every mixed group had one person from each of the five segments of the.
aeronautical R&D community. Four of these groups each considered a
different category of work: basic research, applied research, tech-
nology advancement, or development. Each mixed'group reviewed all of
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the rationale statements and group judgments that pertained to work by
all five aeronautical R&D institutions within the one work category.
The fifth mixed group dealt with the entire spectrum of work
conducted by NASA laboratories. This group considered all rationale
and group judgments that applied to work conducted by government
laboratories. .
:
'" Rankings of rationale. The mixed groups first ranked, in order
of importance, the rationale statements supporting a particular cate-
gory of work by each segment of the aeronautical R&D community. The
rankings applied only to a single segment and no attempt was made to
cross-evaluate rationale for the different types of institutions. The
group that considered NASA evaluated the rationale for government
laboratories relative to NASA laboratories. The group members ranked
the rationale in order of importance within each category of work.
There was no attempt made to cross-rank the importance of rationale for
different categories of work by NASA.
The rankings for all groups were from 1 (highest) to 5 or 6
(lowest). Statements could also be rated below the numerically ranked
items by leaving blanks. A mixed group could indicate that statements
were invalid when four out of the five members agreed to it (©); The
other rankings had to be approved by three or more members of a mixed
group. A mixed group could also add new statements of rationale as had
been done in the earlier sessions.
\ i. Distribution of work. The mixed groups then formulated quanti-,
tative judgments of how .deeply each segment, of the aeronautical R&D
\ community should be engaged in each given category of aeronautical R&D
. for the Government. Each group arrived at a consensus regarding a
• reasonable percentage distribution of federal expenditures among the
\ • ' various segments of the aeronautical R&D community for each category of
work. These determinations were not meant to represent specific recom-
mended numerical constraints. They were to reflect roughly the
I expected extent of the relative roles of the various institutions in
] view of the rationale that had just been considered. The mixed group
that considered NASA laboratories indicated their judgments on the
percentage distribution of NASA laboratory funds that should be
60 \ . . . . •' .
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distributed among in-house basic research, applied research, technol-
ogy advancement, and development. The time allotted for the mixed
group sessions was 1 hour and 20 minutes.
. . ' • - " ' .
INDIVIDUAL EVALUATIONS AND FEEDBACK
A general session was then held for all participants. The
author read each mixed group's rankings of rationale. The participants
duplicated these rankings onto their copies of the hand-held rationale
sheets. This means of feedback probably could have been handled more
efficiently by reproducing and distributing these tables. The partici-
pants then considered all prior judgments and individually ranked the
relative importance of the rationale statements in the left-hand column
of tKsir own hand-held rationale sheets (Appendix C, page 193). The
author then displayed the mixed group's work distribution. The par-
ticipants tlion individually entered their own evaluations of relative
work distribution on special tables provided to each individual
(Appendix C, page 199). This entry was made for each of the four cate-
gories of work and for NASA laboratories. The time allotted for this
phase was 1 hour and 25. minutes.
An extremely high dropout rate occurred in filling out individ-
.ual evaluation forms in the very last portion of this phase, when NASA
laboratories were considered. Immediately, 8 participants dropped out
and this number steadily increased to 17 dropouts. Only one dropout
departed from the conference table. This sudden cessation of activity
may have been caused by the laborious nature of information feedback
and handwritten individual evaluations. On the other hand, it may also
have been caused by concerns that the sponsor (NASA) might be able to
trace individual judgments. Such concerns were later expressed to the
author by several participants. At the end of the workshop, the
 ;par-
ticipants were instructed to code their written evaluation sheets in a
manner that clearly guaranteed anonymity. It would have been better if
the coding had been .done at the beginning of this session,than to post-
pone i t to the end.
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SUMMARY OF TRIBUTARY TECHNIQUE
Figure 2 shows a summary of the tributary process. The initial
questionnaire was not actually part of the conferencing technique since
it was not used in the workshop.
, Questionnaire. Individual ,
Allocation of Funds
Tributary Process
Begins
Homogeneous Groups
Rationale Development.
Rationale Review by Other Homogeneous
Groups. Additions & Invalidations.
±
Mixed Group Review of Rationale.
Additions, Rank Ordering & Invalidations.
Mixed Group
Allocation of Funds.
Individual Rank Ordering of
Rationale a Invalidation
Individual
Allocation of Funds
Figure 2: Summary of Tributary Process
TRIBUTARY TECHNIQUE EVALUATION
At the end of the worksnop, the participants completed ques-
tionnaires aimed at determining their initial reactions to the
tributary technique. The.results are shown in Appendix C, pages
201-202. Eighty-five percent of the participants stated that this
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
?»*zaa^ .>'^ .-ito.!.j.y^ i^ Wa-;^ «<fc.;^ ^
.£>•:"!
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workshop methodology improved comiunications over their-experiences
with methodologies used in previous advisory groups where the topics
* .
were highly subjective and the advisors had naturally diverse group
interests. These participants estimated that they, as a group, had
taken part in over 350 categorically similar meetings. The one par-
ticipant who felt that there was no improvement over prior methods had
taken part in about a dozen categorically similar conferences.'
QUANTITATIVE METHODS
There were essentially three different types of quantitative
data taken during this investigation; rank order numbers, percentage
distributions, and opinion ratings. The first two types of data were
averaged for each group and are reported in that form in Chapter 4.
The third type is reported without alteration. The average values
reported for the rank order data are called group consensus rankings
or just consensus rankings. The average values reported for the
percentage distributions are simply called group percentage, distribu-
tions.
It is extremely important to know the probability of chance in
regard to the participants' judgments. Variations in agreement among
judgments by different members of each group (that is, the scatter in
the data) are reflected in statistical probabilities of chance. These
probabilities are reported along with all average val^e data. They
indicate the statistical probability that the difference between com-
pared mean values could have occurred by chance. A small value for the
probability of chance (P) means that the reported differences between
any two or more average values given by a group were probably due to
strong agreement among the members of the group rather than just a
chance occurrence.
GROUP CONSENSUS RANKINGS
The group consensus rankings were calculated by scoring the
participants' rankings, averaging the scores, and then re-ranking the
items in the same order as the averages.
Rankings and related computations. Appendix C-5 describes the
methods used for ranking, re-scoring the rankings, and then calculating
»^ «a^ a^ a^^ aaua^ ^
ea
•I.-:
63
the group consensus rankings. Group consensus rankings will be the
best estimates of the true overall group rankings if they are statisti-
cally significant (71:100-102). In other words, they must reflect a
low probability of chance.
In considering rankings, it.is important to realize that the
| judgments do not necessarily correspond to the indicated scale interval.
For example, there can be a much greater difference in judgments
between items ranked first and second than between the second ranked
item and an item ranked third.
Agreement among participants. Measures of the extent of agree-
ment among members of the groups, for the group consensus rankings,
were calculated using two related indicators: the Kendall coefficient
of concordance (W) and the associated probabilities of chance
(71:94-106; 72:229-239). The Kendall coefficient of concordance is
simply an index. It equals a value of one when there is perfect agree-
ment among the judges and it approaches close to zero when there is no
agreement. The Kendall coefficients were corrected for ties awarded to.
different items in a ranking by the same judge. The correction for
ties tends to increase the values of the Kendall coefficients..
The probabilities of chance (P) associated with the Kendall
coefficients were also computed for all group consensus rankings
(71:94-106; 72:235-237). The probability of chance was not corrected
; for ties in accordance with accepted methods. It was assumed that the
Kendall coefficients and the group consensus rankings were statisti-
> cally significant when the probabilities of chance were less than or
equal to 5 percent (a < 0.05). Interesting things occurred when the
participants highly agreed on close to the same rank for almost all
items, creating mostly ties. The Kendall coefficients went up because
of the correction for ties. This index indicated that the members
tended to agree. However, the probabilities of chance also increased
which correctly indicated that the differences between group consensus
rankings for the items became statistically insignificant.
The statistical probability of chance was computed for certain
rankings .using the xz-test (72:175) or the binomial test (72:36-42).
These tests were used when there were insufficient variables to employ
Kendall coefficients and the related significance tests. In addition,
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the x2-test was used in some important comparisons to evaluate the sta-
tistical significance of changes in ranks for a particular item, from
one set of circumstances to another. This methodology is covered in
greater detail in the discussion of the results. The results presented
in Chapter 4 show the probability of chance (P) and the statistical
test used in the computations, i.e. W, x2, or reference to the binomial
distribution. • - . ' -'
GROUP PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS
The questionnaire and workshop called for individual partici-
pants to render judgments that involved distributing percentage alloca-
tions among a number of items. The percentages were always required to
total 100 percent when summed up over all the items in a distribution.
Mean values. The group percentage distributions were computed,
by averaging the percentages allocated to any one item by all members
of a group. This averaging was done for each item in the distribution.
Agreement among participants. There were two statis'lcal tests
used to determine the extent of agreement between members of a group in
regard to the mean values. They were the F-test and the t-test. These
statistical tests apply to opinion data which reflect interval scaling
in judgments. Both of the tests yield the probabilities that the indi-
cated differences in mean values might have occurred by pure chance.
The F-test determines the probability of chance for the indicated dif-
ferences in group mean values for an entire percentage distribution
(73:223-230). The t-test is a method used for small samples to deter-
mine if the differences between only two mean values are statistically
significant (73:191-198). The probability of chance (P) was computed
using the t-test for two related samples (74:386). The statistical
probabilities were determined directly from the F dic-tribution and the
t distribution using a Texas Instruments SR-52 calculator, a Hewlett- •
Packard HP-65 calculator, and their associated statistical program
packages. The results given in Chapter 4 indicate F and t values and
identify which statistical tests were used for comparisons, between •
various mean values.
Chapter 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
I. . . : .
1% The discussion of results is divided into three sections. The
fC-y .. •
. |f first section deals with factors that were hypothesized as distin-
I guishing the various segments of the aeronautical R&D community from
i J. . each other in regard to conducting work for the Federal Government.
I These results were obtained by use of the survey questionnaire. The
I second section of this chapter presents the rationale developed during
I the workshop by the aeronautical leaders from the various R&D institu-
| tions. The third section presents the results on the distribution of
*y ~ ' '| . work among the various aeronautical R&D institutions for activities
I ranging from basic research through development.
I HYPOTHESIZED DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF| . . : AERONAUTICAL R&D INSTITUTIONS
' < § . . ' ' • • ' • '
I This section covers the results obtained from the survey ques-
I tionnaire submitted to the participants prior the the workshop.
i QUALITY OF WORK
p . i Table 2 presents the aeronautical leaders' group consensus
j| rankings on the quality of work characteristic of various R&D institu-
1 • tions. The institutions being ranked are shown at the top of the table
jj|- . .. and tne affiliations of the judges are indicated in the left-hand col-
|| ; '; umn- Hence, it is possible to read across any row and determine how
!| the aeronautical leaders from each institution ranked the quality of
work by all aeronautical R&D institutions. The group consensus rank-
ings are from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest). Each group consensus ranking
was calculated by averaging the ranks given to each institution by all
the judges in a group and then awarding group consensus ranks to all
[^ . the institutions in the same order as the averages (pages 62 to 64).
k y . ' : •" : •• '- ' - es =
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The Kendall concordance coefficient in tfie right-hand column indicates
the degree of agreement among the rankings awarded by the judges affil-
iated with the group shown in the left-hand column of the table. Per-
fect agreement would yield a Kendall coefficient of 1 and no agreement
would produce a coefficient close to 0 (see page 63). High Kendall
coefficients, such as shown in' Table 2a, indicate that the individual
judges in each group ranked the relative quality of basic research very
-close" to the values shown in the table. " ""
The total group-consensus rankings shown in the bottom rows of
Table 2 were computed from the individual rankings made by all 25
participants. The total group-consensus ranking is an equally weighted
composite of the judgments of the aeronautical leaders from all of the
institutions. There was statistically significant agreement, among, the
total group of leaders, on the rankings of work quality ever the full
spectrum of R&D. Agreement was assumed to be statistically significant
if there was not more than a probability of 5 percent that the indi-
cated comparisons between values could have occurred by chance. In
Table 2 •
Group Consensus Rankings on Quality of Work
Responses to: ". . . rank the various segments of the aeronautical R and 0-j.
community In order of the relative overall QUALITY of aeronautical R. T and D. •-
work performed. . . . Rank the organizational segments from 1 (highest quality)
to 5 (lowest quality) . . . ."
Table 2a: Basic Research
"^ ^
RANKINGS CF+
BY* ""^ -^ .^
MAN COS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS . (5)
GOV LABS (51
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
MAN
COS
4
5
5
5 .
5.
5
SERV
COS
5
3
4
4
4
4
NON-
PROFS
3
?
2
2
2
2
UNIVS
1
1
1
1
1
1
GOV
LABS
2
4
2
2
2
2
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE
COEFFICIENT (W)
0.81
0.78
0.74
0.85
0.71
0.70 -
I POOR
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Table 2b: Applied Research
>^^ ^
RANKINGS OF-»-
BY4- -->^
MAN COS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON- PROFS (5) .
UNIVS .(5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
MAN
COS
2
4
4
5
5
4
SERV
COS
5
1
2
4
3
3
NON-
PROFS
3
2
1
2
2
2
UNIVS
3
5
5
3
4
4
GOV
LABS
1
2
2
1
1
1
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE
COEFFICIENT (W)
* 0.36
* 0.22
* 0.42
0,68
0.64
0.20
Table 2c: Technology Advancement
"--v^ ,^ '
RANKINGS OF-*-
BY* *^-^ >^
MAN TQS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
.
MAN
COS
1 •
2
5
1
1
1
SERV
COS
3
1
2
2
3
2
NON-
PROFS
3
3
1
4
3
3
UNIVS
5
' 5
4
5
5
5
GOV
LABS
2
3
2
3
1
3
,
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE;
COEFFICIENT (W)
0.62
0.51
* 0.31
0.78
0.57
0:31
"1
i
Table 2d: Development
^ ^
RANKINGS OF-*-
BY4- "^ -<*v^
MAN COS (5)
SERV COS . (5)
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
MAN
COS
1
i
i
i
i
i
SERV
COS
3
2
2
2
2
2
NON-
PROFS
2
4
2
4
4
4
UNIVS
5
5
5
5
5
5
GOV
LABS
2
3
4
3
2
3
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE
COEFFICIENT (W)
0.83
•-- 0.71
0.81
0.81 '
0.90
0.77
. • -
Over 95% probability in cases not asterisked that ranking by each group reflected'! oeaningful
group discriaination of differences in ranks, rather than chance variations (P < a - 0.05).
Asterisk (•) indicates fiis probability is under 95V.
*..****&. .!^ .-x*&f.x,tf.;--SscsJf.^ xL=t^ \*.:
• • •:; • ..; I ^-,
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other words, there had to be at least a probability of 95 percent that
the consensus values represented a meaningful overall group discrimina-
tion between ranks. The Kendall coefficients indicate that the extent
of agreement among all the participants was the highest for basic
research and development, which represent the two outer extremes of the
R&D spectrum. The extent of agreement among all participants, as a
group, was lowest for applied research.
The total group-consensus rankings in Table 2 indicate that the
aeronautical R&D institutions produce qualities of work that complement
each other across the R&D spectrum. The institutions that characteris-
tically produce the highest quality of work in each category were con-
sidered to be universities for basic research, government laboratories
for applied research, and manufacturing companies for both technology
advancement and development. The total group-consensus rankings for
the universities reflect their orientation towards fundamentals, rather
than more applied pursuits. The non-profit R&D institutions were
recognized as supporting the prime institutions with quality work
because they received the second highest places for both basic and -
applied research. The more applied supporting roles of the service R&D
companies were apparent from the second place consensus ranks they
received for the quality of technology advancement and development.
i. The quality of work by manufacturing companies was conside.-ed high for
technology advancement and development, but low for basic and applied
!
 research. This finding suggests that manufacturing companies are most
oriented towards creating competitive,..new, near-term products.1 They do
not seem so well oriented towards research for far-term innovations in
aeronautics. The government laboratories were the only institution that
received total group-consensus ranks that were within the top;three
places for the quality of work over the entire spectrum of all R&D
activities. This finding implies that government laboratories have a
broader orientation than do other aeronautical R&D institutions.
There was significant internal agreement on 75 percent, of the .
sub-group consensus rankings. The aeronautical leaders from the
universities and government laboratories were the only two sub-groups
that displayed significant internal agreement on all consensus rankings
0?
\
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of all four categories of work by all the institutions. There was also
remarkably close agreement between these sub-group consensus rankings
and the overall consensus rankings by all participants.
Biases in sub-group self-rankings can be evaluated by examining
the diagonal of numbers extending from the upper left to the lower
right of every table. A bias becomes apparent when a rank on this
self-ranking diagonal is better than any of the ranks awarded by peer
. sub-groups. This bias can be seen by comparing a rank on the diagonal
with values up and down a column from the diagonal. A total of
45 percent of the sub-group consensus self-rankings was better than any
comparable rankings by peer sub-groups. None of the self-rankings were
below peer group rankings. It is also interesting to note that
 ;
three-fourths of the sub-group self-rankings were either 1 or 2 for all
categories of work. Every sub-group displayed some natural biases in
ranking the quality of their own work, except the university leaders.
Hence, there were natural biases when the sub-groups ranked the quality
of work by their own institution. However, a careful comparison of
sub-group rankings indicates that the total group-consensus ranking, in
the bottom rows of Table 2, balanced out individual sub-group biases.
'(-.. • . .-' QUALITY OF AERONAUTICAL R&D FROM NASA LABORATORIES
{ The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
I : replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in
j : 1958. Numerous recommendations have been made that the Government
! ; should support all R&D, including aeronautical R&D, in a manner charac-
( ;, teristic earlier of NACA (8:53; 23:48; 42:58; 45:Appendix B:9, 11, 19,
:
 . 29). Table 3a presents the first of several comparisons that were
; aimed at exploring what basic differences exist, if any, between NACA
r and NASA laboratories in regard to in-house aeronautical R&D. Table 3a
shows the number of aeronautical leaders that ranked the quality of
aeronautical R&D by NASA's laboratories either below, equal, or above
that of the old NACA.
Notation (8:53; 23:48; 42:58 and so forth means Reference 8:
page 53 and Reference 23: page 48 and Reference 42: page 58 and so
.forth. - - • . . . . '
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All comparisons in Table 3a were statistically significant.
The bottom row in this table shows the number of aeronautical leaders
that would have been expected to rank NASA respectively below, equal,
and above NACA, if the rankings had been made by completely random
selections under the probabilities of chance for infinite size samples.
When 2 numbers are selected at random and each of them may range from
1 to 5, there are 5 ways that the 2 numbers could turn :out: equal
(P=0.20) and 20 ways that they could be unequal (P=0.80). There is the
same probability (P=0.40) that the second number could be higher or
lower than the first number. Hence, one would expect that out of every
25 random selections of 2 numbers there would be 5 equal numbers, 10
lower second numbers, and 10 higher second numbers relative to the
first numbers selected. •
The results in Table 3a indicate that the aeronautical leaders,
as a group, believed that the quality of basic research and applied
research in aeronautics by NASA laboratories is below that characteris-
tic of the earlier NACA laboratories. The aeronautical leaders, as a
group, believed that the quality of NASA's laboratory work in aeronau-
tical technology advancement is about the, same as it was for NACA.
However, the participants indicated that the quality of NASA's in-house
development work in aeronautics is superior to that of NACA.
Table 3b presents a comparison of the quality of -. =ronautical
R&D by NASA laboratories relative to all government laboratories. The
results indicate that the aeronautical leaders, as a group, perceived
no differences between NASA laboratories, and other government labora-
tories in regard to the quality of any category of work. This conclu-
sion is indicated either by (a) the number of aeronautical leaders that
gave equal ranking- to both NASA and overall government laboratories,
(b) an equal number of leaders ranking NASA both above and below
overall government laboratories, and (c) a lack of statistical signifi-
cance in rankings.
UTILITY OF RESULTS j
An initial hypothesis was that the aeronautical R&D leaders (
would weigh the usefulness of the results produced by the various insti- !
tutions differently than quality of their work. The results in Table 4 \
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Table 3
Quality of Aeronautical Px&D by NASA Laboratories
compared with
Earlier NACA Laboratories and Overall Government Laboratories
(Displays number of laaders making indicated ranking)
Responses to: "Similarly rank the relative QUALITY of In-house aeronautical worJc characteristic of Just
NASA/NACA. Use a scale from 1 (highest quality) to 5 (lowest quality) relative to the segments of the
aeronautical R and D community shown in the previous matrix. . . . NASA/NACA may tank equal to.
higher cr lower than the overall government laboratory segment."
Table 3a: NASA (1976) versus NACA (1958)
*^v^ ^ QUALITY
^^-^FROM
WORK \^^
BASIC RESEARCH
APPLIED RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
ADVANCEMENT
PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT
EXPECTED FROM
PURE CHANCE
NASA
BELOW
NACA
17
14
5
3
IP
NASA
EQUALS
NACA
6
7
12
7
5
NASA
ABOVE .
NACA
2
4
8
15
10
PROBABILITY OF CHANCE
X2
11.50
6.00
12.70
8.20
PROB. (P)
0.3%
5.0%
0.2%
1.7%
Table 3b: NASA versus Overall Government Laboratories
•^s^  QUALITY
•^\FROM
WORK ^-^ +
BASIC RESEARCH
APPLIED RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
ADVANCEMENT
PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT
EXPECTED FROM
PURE CHANCE
NASA
BELOW
GOV LABS
8
9
5
11.
10
NASA
EQUALS
GOV LABS
9
12
11
7
5
NASA
ABOVE
GOV LABS
8
4
9:
7
10
PROBABILITY .OF CHANCE
x2
4.00 ;
13.50 •
9.8o: ;.
1.80
PROB. (P)
* 13.6%
0.1%
0.7%
* 40.?%
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Table 4
Comparisons of Rankings of Work Quality versus Utility of Results'
(Shown 1n number of leaders making rankings)
Responses to; "... rank the various segments of the aeronaut teal R and D
community in order of the relative overall USEFULNESS of the RESULTS they pro-
duced. . . . Rank the results produced by each organization In order of
USEFULNESS from 1 (greatest usefulness) to 5 (least usefulness) . . . ."
WORK
CATEGORY
BASIC
RESEARCH
APPLIED
RESEARCH
CONDUCTED
BY
MANGOS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON- PROFS.
UNIVS
GOV LABS
EXPECTED FROM PURE CHANCE
UTILITY
BELOW
QUALITY
1
2
4
4
7
5
5
4.
9
4
10
UTILITY
EQUALS
QUALITY
19
17
21
21
17
14
16
16
11
17
5
UTILITY
ABOVE
QUALITY
' 5
6
0
0
1
6
4
5
5
4
10
PROBABILITY OF CHANCE
X2
49.80
36.80
64.80
64.80
37.80
20.30
30.30
30.30
9.80
36.00
PRCB. (P)
Below 0.1%
it
it
it
ii
M
II
II '
•II
.11
-
I
^^
Table 4 (Continued)
. WORK
CATEGORY
TECHNOLOGY
ADVANCEMENT
PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT
CONDUCTED
BY
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON- PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
EXPECTED FROM PURE CHANCE
UTILITY
BELOW
QUALITY ,
5
7
6
4
3
0
4
3
2
3
10
UTILITY
EQUALS
QUALITY
13
15
17
18
15
25
18
19
22
17
5
UTILITY
ABOVE
QUALITY
7
3
2
3
7
0
: 3
3
1
5
10
PROBABILITY OF CHANCE
X2
16.20
25.80
36.80
42.30
25.80
100.00
42.30
49.00
72.30
36.20
PROB, (P)
Below 0.1%
ti
it
it
ii
M
ii
it
ii
ii
..-r.T
. . .
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indicate that the participants did not differentiate between utility
and quality. Hence, no further comparisons for the utility of R&D are
presented in this publication. -
ABILITY TO FOCUS ON SPECIFIC REAL PROBLEMS '
Table 5 presents group consensus rankings on the characteristic
ability of the aeronautical R&D institutions to focus on achieving
solutions to specific real problems. :
Table 5
Ability to Focus on Solving Specific Real Problems
Group Consensus Rankings
Responses to: "All other things being equal, rank each of the following types of
organisation In order of their ability to focus on achieving solutions to
specific real problems. . . . front 1 (most able) to 5 (least able) for each type
of organization." .
>
"^ -^ .
RANKINGS -OF-*-
BY+ ^ ^^ ^
MANGOS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
MAN
COS
1
1
1
1
1
1
SERV
COS
3 .
2
2
1
2
2
NON-
PROFS
2
3
3
3
3
3
UNIVS
5
5
5
5
5
5
GOV
LABS
4
3
4
3
3
4
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE
COEFFICIENT (W)
0.52
* 0.34
0.65
0.65
0.54
0.42
1
Over 95% probability in cases not asterisked that ranking by each group reflected a netningful
froup discriBination of differences in ranks, rather than chance variations (P < a » O.OS).
Asterisk (•) indicates this probability is under 95%. •
There was significant agreement on the total group-consensus ranking
shown on the bottom of the table. The total group-consensus .ranking
indicates that manufacturing companies were believed to have the
greatest ability to focus on solving specific real problems. The manu
facturing companies were followed in order of ability by service R&D
companies, non-profit R&D institutions, government laboratories, and
universities. It is interesting to note that the government labora-
tories were ranked fourth in this comparison even though they were
• • , - ; • • . . . . . • • . • - . • - . • . .
 ; . ' • • - 7 5
ranked first on the quality of applied research shown in Table 2b on
page 67. This infers that the government laboratories were considered
to produce the highest quality applied research, bufthey did not seem
so effective in bringing their talents and resources to tear on solving
specific real problems as are most institutions in the private'sector.
The sub-group consensus rankings were not markedly different
than the total group-consensus ranking. Only the sub-group from ser-
! '.'••: ;.,-. vice R&D companies, internally,-did not significantly agree on their
. ! consensus rankings. The government laboratories were ranked between
1 third and fourth by all sub-groups. Even the leaders from the universi-
ties ranked their institution last in regard to the ability to focus on
and solve specific real problems.
I DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
There are two types of results that occur when the Government
I expends funds on research and technology. The primary results appear
at the end of the effort in terms of a required output, such as a" docu-
ment, a computer program, or hardware. The primary output often enters
'.•'.'•'' the public domain under most government contracting procedures for
research and technology. However, t.iare is also a secondary result in
the form of an increased capability and retained body of knowledge that
remains within the organization that performed the v/ork. This incre-
ment in internal capability and captured knowledge can give performing .
organizations a competitive advantage over other organizations. The
-•-"•; Government may indeed wish to build up residual capabilities and stores
of knowledge in aeronautical R&B'organizations. However, the Govern-
ment may also wish to have this publically funded knowledge and capac- 1
ity openly accessible for purposes that will serve all American avia-
tion. The staff of the Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space . •'
Sciences expressed the following concern in regard to aeronautical |
| .. research: .' : , ?j
I We question whether scientists end engineers in private, indus- ]| . try who are exploring new basic technology under contract to ,!
I NASA are truly accessible to .engineers in competing com- , : j
•\ panies . . . . Thus, we are concerned that heavy, reliance on - "
•| out-of-house contracting for basic aeronautical research will /.. «
I inhibit healthy competition in the industry's application of |
I that technology (53:23). , |
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Table 6 presents group consensus rankings on the willingness of
the various institutions to provide outside organizations with full
information on government-funded research and technology, even beyond
the information contained in published reports required by the Govern-
ment. Development purposely was not considered in this assessment
because competition in even government-funded development programs is
considered desirable in the fr.ee enterprise economic system. Competi-
tion naturally leads to restrictions in disclosures between competitors.
However, the Government usually expends funds on aeronautical research
and technology advancement specifically for the purpose of advancing
the overall aviation industry.
There was remarkably high agreement among the total group of 25
aeronautical leaders in regard to the relative willingness of different
types of institutions to fully disclose the results of government-
funded research and technology. The total group-consensus rankings
indicate the following things. The universities were considered the
-most willing to provide full information. They were followed in
descending order of willingness by government laboratories, non-profit
R&D institutions, service R&D companies, and finally, manufacturing
companies (Table 6). It is interesting that this was the exact
reverse of the total group-consensus rankings of the characteristic
ability of these institutions to focus on and solve specific real
problems (Table 5). The results in Tables 5 and 6 thus imply ,that the
greatest competitive inclinations tend to exist on the part of institu-
tions whose internal capabilities are most directly oriented toward
solving problems associated with specific applications.
The results shown in Table 6 are consistent with earlier inves-
tigations. Vollmer found that research managers sampled in industry
indicated that it would be cause for dismissal if a researcher gave
research ideas to outsiders without clearance from his own management
(57:61). However, research managers sampled in universities, govern-
ment laboratories, and non-profit R&D institutions indicated that
giving research ideas to outsiders would not be ade'.jate grounds for
dismissal in thoie institutions. The evidence obtained on publication
rates and the influence of publications on salaries of engineers and
scientists in these institutions all indicated that open publication
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was more frequent and was valued to a greater extent in universities,
government laboratories> and non-profit institutions, than they were in
manufacturing companies.
It is interesting to note in Table & that even the leaders from
the manufacturing companies ranked their own institution last. The
leaders from the service R&D companies ranked their own institution
next to last. There was strong internal agreement in these sub-gr^'ips
on these rankings. The sub-group consensus rankings were also close to
the total group-consensus rankings by all participants.
Table 6
Willingness to Disseminate Research and Technology
Group Consensus Rankings
Responses to: "Rank the following types of organization In order of their .
vHlin&ness to provide outside organizations with,FULL INFORMATION on government
funded KESLAKCH ar.d TECHNOLOGY, even beyond the'information contained in published
reports required by the government. . . , vrlte one number In each box, from 1
•(most willing) to 5. (least willing) for each segment of the aeronautical
community." . ; .
~""
<
,^ ' •
RANKINGS OF-*
BYV "^--^ ^
MAN COS .(5)
SERV COS (5)
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL 25
PARTICIPANTS
MAN
COS
5
5
5
S
5
5
SERV
COS
4
4
4
4
4
4
NON-.
PROFS
3
3
2
3
3
3
UNIVS
1
1
1
1
1
1
GOV
LABS
2
1
2
2 ..
1
2
KENDALL
CONCORDANCE
COEFFICIENT (W)
0.80
0.58
0.90
0.89
0.95
. ' i
0.79 '
|
Over 95\ probability in all ci
group discricination of diffe:
ases that ranking by each group reflected a meaningful
rences in ranks, rather than chance variations'.
EXPERIMENTAL FACILITIES ;, ..• I
Figure 3 indicates that the aeronautical leaders:from all R&D
institutions quite strongly believed that major aeronautical experi-
mental facilities built by the Federal Government should be managed by
organizations that would provide usage and/or results to the entire
aeronautical community.
tfss'SS*
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Opinion on statement: "Major
government should be managed
results to the entire aeronai
MAN COS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
~1 1
-4 -3
strongly
disagree
aeronautical e^periaental
by organization* chat will
itlcal community."
1
1
1 I
-2 -1
1
1
1
0
neutral
facilities built by the
provide usage and/or
.
!
1
II
1 1
1 2
1
III
1
1
1
3
III
HII
II
Ilk
1
4
strongly
agree
Figure 3: Usage of Major Experimental Facilities and Results-,
Figure 4 shows the aeronautical leaders from all R&D institu-
tions were substantially of the opinion that resident research groups
should be located at major experimental facilities, if these facilities
can be useful for basic or applied research.
[ Opinion on statement: "There should be reo-ldent research groups located at major
I a.r^iutlcal experiocntal facilities built by the Federal Government, If theseftfcllltib* c*~ be useful for baalc or applied research."
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
•GOV LABS
(5)
(5)
(5)
(5)
(5)'
strongly
disagree
neutral
'• •
1 I I 1
-4 -3 -2 -1
1
1
1
1
I
0
1
1
1
1
II
1
1
1
2
II V
I
1
I I
1
1
3
II
1
I I
II
1
1
4
strongly
agree
Figure 4: Location of Research Groups at
Major Experimental Facilities
• ' •"•'.- • - 79
Figure 5 indicates the aeronautical leaders' views on whether
government or private institutions can most effectively,manage and con-
trol major experimental facilities for aeronautical R&D. The sub- >
groups from the manufacturing companies and service R&D companies were
almost evenly divided on this issue. The leaders frcm non-profit R&D
institutions believed that institutions in the private sector could
most effectively manage and control these facilities; The leaders from
government laboratories and universities both believed the Government
could most effectively manage and control major government-built
experimental facilities.
MAN COS
Opinion on statement . "Organizations
manage and control major
(5)
SERV COS (5) II
In the private
governraent-bu tit
1
facllltle
U
1
NON-PROFS (5)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
1
1
1
-4
strongly
disagree
1
1
-3
II
II
i
-2
1
1
I'
-1
1'
0
sector can
5 than can
1
1
1
1
neutral
more effectively
the government."
1
II I
1
1 i
2 3
u
1
!
4
strongly
' agree
Figure 5: Most Effective Institutional Control of Major
Government-Built Experimental Facilities
Table 7 presents the aeronautical leaders' final judgments on
the organizations that actually should have custody and managerial con-
trol of major aeronautical experimental facilities built by the Federal
Government. The institutional affiliation of each group of judges is
shown in the first column at the left of the table. The top row of the
table displays the types of organizations that would receive a percent-
age of the total capital value of the major experimental facilities
built by the Federal Government. The figures in the columns under each
type of institution show the average percentages of the total capital
POOB
value of all such facilities that were awarded to that organization by
each of the sub-groups shown in the column on the far left of the tabled
The values in each row should total 100 percent except for small round
off errors. The distribution of average percentages among the various
institutions, along each row, is termed the group percentage distribu-
tion of experimental facilities. The column of numbers on the far
right of Table 7 gives the probability that the group percentage dis-
tribution in each row might have occurred by chance.
Table 7
Distribution of Major Experimental Facilities
Group Consensus Percentage Distribution
(percentage of total capital value of all
major, government-built, aeronautical,
experimental facil i t ies--
over $1,000,000 each)
Responses to: "Roughly Indicate the percentage of the capital value of all major
aeronautical experimental facilities built by the government that you think should
be located at and under the managerial control of the following type* of
•organizationa."
DISTRIBUTION FOR
BY4- """--CL
MAN COS (5)
SERV COS (5)
NON- PROFS (4)
UNIVS (5)
GOV LABS (5)
ALL
RESPONSES (24)
MAN
COS
3 %
0
12
7
3
5 *
SERV
COS
6 %
20
15
5
2
10 %
NON-
PROFS
3 %
6
12
12
10
8 %
UNIVS
8 %
9
9
10
7
8 %
GOV
LABS
47 %
26
28 '.
38
57
40 %
GOV
TEST
ORG
33 %
39
24
28
21
29 %
PROBABILITY
OF CHANCE
F
9.50
2.90
*1.63
8.38
7.05
23.^ 57
PROS. (P)
P<0.1%
3 %
20 %
P<0.1%
P<0.1%
P<0.1%
There was signif icant agreement among all participants or. the
total group percentage dis t r ibut ion shown on the bottom row of Table 7.
The total group decision favored placing the largest share of the .
experimental facil i t ies under the Government (69%). This could be a
is9s .
reflection of aeronautical leaders' concern over general accessability
by their organizations to the facilities and the results from these
.facilities. The aeronautical leaders distributed more of the major
.experimental facilities to government laboratories (40%) than to
government test centers (29%). This result reflected their interest in
having resident research groups at these facilities.
There was significant internal agreement in all the sub-groups
on the percentage distribution of experimental facilities/except for
the sub-group from the non-profit R&D institutions. Non-profit R&D
institutions was the only sub-group that also believed that the private
sector could more effectively manage and control major experimental
facilities built by the Government (Figure 5). The various, sub-groups
differed by factors of two or more in regard to some of the percentages
of experimental facilities allocated to certain institutions. The
differences are easily reconciled by taking self-oriented biases into
account and neglecting the statistically non-significant results. In
, fact, the group consensus'distribution for the total group apparently
balanced out most of the biases.
TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON CONTRACTS • • " T".
The policy of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
been to contract a- ^ch government work as possible to the private
sector rather than having it.done by the Government itself (54).
Assume for a moment that all aeronautical .R&O was contracted to the
private sector without regard to any other factor. First of all, the
Government would still have to select and plan paths to advance aero-
nautical- R&D. It would still have to determine +:.e best technical pro-
grams to pursue. These decisions involve resolving technical issues
regarding both what is needed and what is feasible. The Government-
would still have to select the best technical projects from among many
proposals. It would have to continue to seek contractors, evaluate the
technical merits of competitive proposals, select;the best- proposals
and most competent contractors for the wc:-k, provide the contractors
with technical guidance toward the desired goals, insure that the
technical progress of the work trained on track, provide additional
!__H
"Page missing from available verson
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:: Technology advancement (T) is the systematic adaptation and use
of knowledge to achieve the capability of practical Industrial applica-
tions, the expansion of the engineering and Industrial arts, and
advancement of the mechanisms for product development and production.
This Includes expansion of basic engineering data, methods, techniques,
basic componentry, tools, and experience needed to be able to develop
and produce products. This process sometimes requires major large-
scale hardware Integration steps, including building and testing
"bread boards" of components, "technology demonstration" hardware, and
so-called "proof-of-concept" hardware. Technology advancement can be
properly and successfully justified on the basis of being necessary
preparatory steps to achieve needed, or improved, product developments
or manufacturing methods. ;
 ;
: : Development (D) is the study, design, engineering, testing,
tooling, and construction that are necessary prior to, and for the
purpose of, obtaining an end product to be manufactured. It includes
the development of end-item components and subsystems. The development
process results in one or more prototype test articles from which
evolves the. item to be manufactured.
m
• -s
m
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'•Aeronautics.Advisory Project "V-.•-.- ..--.. -
770 Welch Road
!
 Suite 154 ! ' • • : ' • "
'.Palo Alto, California 94304 -J - ' .>-YV
•^ ' •••-.-, ,\-;;.';-';'>- AERONAUTICS ADVISORY SURVEY '•
. ' - ..'.I. FEDERALLY SUPPORTED AERONAUTICAL R. T and D
; . / ; : - . . • • : ; ;.'••-..-,; '-\v- --'I'.-' INTRODUCTION '.'•..'.• .'-"•••
In this questionnaire we request some fairly general ;jdgments,
advice and opinions regarding the conduct of federally supposed . .. .
aeronautical R, T and D by the various segments of the aeronautical
R and D community. For the purpose of this questionnaire, Federal '
support of the private sector will mean all government expenditures,
direct and indirect, associated with contracts and grants to the private
- sector for original R, T and D. These funds may come from any Federal
source, including government laboratories. On the other hand,'Federal
support of and related expenditures by government laboratories will
;
 refer to all government funds, direct and indirect, for ORIGINAL
• IN-HOUSE R, T and D conducted by government engineers and scientists
• from these laboratories. This includes all Federal- funds- expended for
salaries, 'overhead, facility constructions, instrumentation and all
support service contracts associated with government laboratory
personnel conducting in-house work. ••• .';
.'.-:."''•>,,•:.. II GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS ' '.'•:,: .
:
: •'.' The questions rhat follow will require considerable thought based
''.. on your general background and experience. At tines, you may feel that
^your background is insufficient to give firm answers. Nevertheless, we
would appreciate it if you would fully answer all of the questions as
'best you can. We expect to gain considerable insight from the sua total
-. of all the responses because the cumulative experience of all the
'•participants will be quite broad. The relative degree of uncertainty
the participants may have in regard to any questions will be properly
reflected by the scatter of the data, that is the variation in the
answers received from all participants as a group. Therefore, it is
important that you complete!/ answer all questions.
Some questions ask you to make a single selection from among a
group of answers, where more than one may seem to apply. Please select
the .answer that seems most applicable, but never give more than the
• number of answers requested. .
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7. TECHNICAL DISCIPLINE (Check below only one prime topic area,
i.e. check one box)
Systems technology
D Vehicle.design, studies
and analyses
D Effectiveness and safety
D Support Systems
.D Flight Testing
Atmospheric sciences
Aero acoustics
O Atmospheric environment
D Fluid and gas dynamics
O Thermophysics
Q Plasmadynamics
Propulsion :
Air breathing prop,
systems •
Propulsion, continued
D Rocket propulsion systems- ..-.
D Fuels and propellants •""""
D Combustion
Mechanics and Control J.'
D Flight mechanics "and Control
D Guidance and control
D Avionics
Structures and Materials
D Structures
Q Structural dynamics
D Materials
D Other '
(write in)
DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES OF R, T and D WORK
Read over all the following definitions of categories of-
aeronautical R6D work. These definitions will be used throughout
the questionnaire; therefore, it is very important for you to be
completely familiar with them. You will also need them to answer
the next questions about yourself.
BASIC RESEARCH (R) - is the SCIENTIFIC pursuit of fundamental
KNOWLEDGE in a general technical area, independent of known -applica-
tions. The results consist of new theories, basic experimental
observations (data), r-'.u understanding of physical nature. The
knowledge gained is expected to be of such interest or value within the
technical area, that the work can be properly and successfully justi-
fied without being tied to specific known applications. ••'
APPLIED RESEARCH (R) - is also the SCIENTIFIC pursuit'of fundamental
KNOWLEDGE, but it is aimed toward restricted types of applications or a.
particular application. The results consist of theories, systematic,
experimental data (which may be quite extensive and detailed) and under-
standing. Applied research solves the basic problems and opens the way
for the technological advancements needed to achieve the desired !•';/;
applications. Applied research is properly and successfully justified'
primarily by expected advances relative to such applications. .,V
TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT (T) - is the systematic adaptation and use
of knowledge to achieve the capability of practical industrial applica-
tions, the expansion of the ENGINEERING and INDUSTRIAL ARTS, and '
advancement of the MECHANISMS for product development and production.;
This includes expansion of basic engineering data, methods, techniques,
basic componentry, tools and experience needed to be able to develop
and produce products. This process sometimes requires major large-scale
hardware integration steps, including building and testing "bread boards"
of components, "technology demonstration" hardware and sor'called.'
"proof-of-concept" hardware. Technology advancement can be properly .
and successfully justified on the basis of being necessary preparatory
or
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steps to achieve needed, or improved, product developments or
manufacturing methods.
DEVELOPMENT CD) - the study, design, engineering, testing,
tooling, and construction that are necessary prior to, and for the
purpose of, obtaining.. an end product to be manufactured. It includes
the development of end-item components and subsystems. The development
process results in one or more prototype test articles from which
evolves the item to^be manufactured. '" '..'."'
YOUR CATEGORY OF WORK
8. Refer to the preceding definitions of R, T and D. Check the
kind of aeronautical work below that you are primarily associated with
in your current position (check one).
O Basic Research
O Applied Research
O Technology Advancement
D Development
D Other
(Write in)
9. Refer again to the preceding list of definitions of R, T and
D. Check the type of work below that is the primary business of your
company, division, or organization (check one). .
D Basic Research
D Applied Research
O Technology Advancement
C Development
D Other
(Write in)
I •>
M •
II
jl
DEFINITIONS
OF
SEGMENTS OF THE AERONAUTICAL R5D COMMUNITY
Read over all of the following definitions of organizations
involved in aeronautical R, T and D. These definitions of the various
segments of the aeronautical R and D community are used throughout the
questionnaire. It is important to be familiar with all of the defini-
tions. Questions about them will follow.
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES (MAN COS) - commercial concerns that
primarily manufacture products as their major source of gross income
and profits.
SERVICE R6D COMPANIES (SERV COS) - commercial concerns'
that principally provide original R, T or D and other non-manufacturing
services for other companies, government agencies or the public to
obtain its primary source of gross income and profits. Service may
extend from research to product development, such as may be performed
by research associations, consulting firms and small .RgD companies.
NON-PROFIT R6D INSTITUTIONS (NON-PROFS) - institutes and
institutions that primarily perform R, T and D services for companies,
the government or the public—without opportunity for profit,
dividends or capital gains by owners. This segment includes separate
institutes affiliated with universities and non-profit subsidiaries
of profit companies.
1
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I • '•'" ' -" • "•••UNIVERSITIES (UNIVS) - colleges, technical institutes, technical
schools or universities where education is recognized as the central
function of the organization; and within which other professional activi-
ties in R, T and D exist to a greater or lesser extent than education.
GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES (GOV LABS] - all in-house government
laboratories where original aeronautical R, T or D is performed. Such
laboratories may also contract with organizations in the private sector
j '-••• - . for R, T and D to a greater, or lesser extent than the in-house work.
' For the purpose of'this survey, work by governments-laboratories refers
strictly to in-house work and direct expenditures by government
laboratories related to in-house work. :
GOVERNMENT RSD FUNDING ORGANIZATIONS (GOV FUND ORGS) -
... government organizations that distribute technical work among other
-• . groups, monitor the work and provide funding for contract or in-house
.'-'••-'. .-:•.._ government R, T or D done by other organizations. Government R6D
""'.'.. funding organizations do little or no in-house R, T or D of their own
" --
;in comparison to their funding activities. But, they may be involved
in considerable technical monitoring, study, direction, and guidance
activities.
* "' -^.' - '' - *| -'YOUR AFFILIATION
10. Referring to the previous list of organizational definitions,
check the type of organization below that best describes the principal
, nature of your company, division, institution or government organization.
Q Manufacturing Company (3 Govtrnment Lab
D Service RSD Company Q Government RSD Fund Org
D Non-profit RSD Company D Other
(Write in)
IV. JUDGMENTS, OPINIONS AND ADVICE
11. QUALITY OF WORK
In the following matrix, rank the various segments of the
aeronautical RSD community in order of the relative overall
QUALITY of aeronautical R, T and D work performed. Proceed down
each column in the matrix and enter one number in each box. Rank
the organizational segments from 1 (highest quality) to 5 (lowest
quality) for the type of work indicated at the head of the column.
See definitions given on pages 3-5.
• . _ T~~
.=_»W:'/W
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QUALITY OF WORK
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
Basic
Research
Applied
Research
Technology..
Advancement Development
• •
Sample
12. Similarly rank the relative QUALITY of in-house aeronautical
work characteristic of just NASA/NACA. Use a scale from 1 (highest
quality) to .5'(lowest quality) relative to the segments of the
aeronautical R5D . community shown in the previous matrix. NASA/
NACA laboratories fall within the general category of government ••
laboratories. Nevertheless, NASA/NACA may rank equal to, higher or
lower than the overall government laboratory segment.
' QUALITY OF WORK BY NASA/NACA
NASA
NACA (to
19581
Basic
Research
Applied
Research.
Technology
Advancement
. •. — r.
Development
/
13. USEFULNESS OF RESULTS
In the following matrix, rank the various segments of .the
aeronautical RfiD . community in order of the relative overall
USEFULNESS of the RESULTS they produced. Proceed down each column
in the matrix and enter one number in each box. Rar.k the results
produced by each organization in order of USEFULNESS from 1 (greatest
usefulness) to 5 (least usefulness) for the type of work shown at the
head of each column. .
OFpoou
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USEFULNESS OF RESULTS
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
Basic
Research
Applied
Research
Technology
Advancement development Sample
14. Similarly rank the relative overall USEFULNESS of the in-house
aeronautical work characteristic of just NASA/NACA. Again, use a
scale from 1 (greatest usefulness) to 5 (least usefulness} relative
to the segments of the aeronautical community shown in the previous
matrix.
USEFULNESS OF NASA/NACA RESULTS
NASA
NACA(to 1958;
Basic
Research
Applied
Research
Technology
Advancement Development
IS. PROBLEM CONSTRAINTS
• AH-other things being equal,
rank, each of the following types of
organization in order of their ability
to focus on achieving solutions to
specific real problems. Proceed down
the column and write one number in each
box, from 1 (most able) to 5 (least
able) for each type of organization.
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
Ability
to Focus
I
• r
3
4
•f.
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16. DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
Rank the following types
of organization in order of their
willingness to provide outside
organisations with FULL INFORMA-
TION on government funded
RESEARCH and TECHNOLOGY, ever,
beyond the information contained
in published reports required by
the government. Proceed down
the column and write one number
in each box, from 1 (most
willing) to 5 (least willing)
for each segment of the aeronautical
community.
! • '••
HAN COS
SERV COS
NON- PROFS
UNIVS
COV LABS
Willingness to provide
•'• information
•".--
MAJOR EXPERIMENTAL FACILITIES
A major experimental facility is defined here as a general
experimental facility costing about a million dollars or morel- Please
indicate your oyinion in regard to the following statements by circling
an appropriate number following each statement.
17. "Major aeronautical experimental facilities built by the
government should be managed by organizations that will provide usage
and/or results to the entire aeronautical community."
strongly
disagree neutral
strongly
agree
18. "Organizations in the private sector can more effectively manage
and control major government-built facilities than can the government."
-3 -2 -1
strongly
disagree neutral
strongly
agree
19. "'ihere should be resident research groups located at major
aeronautical experimental facilities built by the Federal Government, if
these facilities can be useful for basic or applied research."
-3 -2 -1
strongly
disagree neutral
strongly
agree
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20. Roughly indicate the percentage of the capital value of all
najor aeronautical experimental facilities built by the government
that you think should be located at and under the managerial control
of the following types of organizations.
 ;.,, .... .,
Manufacturing Cos: %
Service R6D Cos: V .
Non-Prof it . .. . .'
- . • ' . . Institutions % ' " . .
Universities: %
Government Labs: %
Government
Test Centers: %
Total: 100%
21. TECHNICAL GUIDANCE OF CONTRACTS
In the following matrix, rank the various segments of the
aeronautical RED community in order of how well you believe they
can provide the government with IMPARTIAL TECHNICAL GUIDANCE on
CONTRACTS with other organizations for each of the indicated categories
of work. Contract technical guidance includes: technical advocacy of
needed new contracts, technical evaluation of proposals, selection of
competent- contracts, technical guidance of contractors, checking
technical work, helping solve technical problems and evaluating results.
Proceed down each column and enter one number in each box. Rank "each
type of organization in order of ability to provide government with
impartial technical contract guidance by entering a number from
1 (most able) :to 6 (least able) for each of the categories of work
shown at the head of the column. See pages 3-5 for definitions of any
terms that are unfamiliar.
IMPARTIAL TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON CONTRACTS
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON- PROFS
UNIVS
GOV LABS
GOV FUND ORG
Basic
Research
Apnlied
Research
Technology
Advancement Development
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22. • DISTRIBUTION OF WORK '
This question is intended to reflect your view on roughly
the extent to which different segments of the aeronautical RSD
community should participate in each category of federally funded ,
work in order, to best advance American aeronautics. Assume that there
is a set amount of federal funding available for each category of work.
Write the percentage of these funds that you feel should be expended by
each segment of the aeronautical R§D community.
The introduction (Page 1) defines the funding break-down
relative to government laboratories and their contractors. You might
refer back to it if this is not clear now. It might also be a good idea
at this point to review the definitions of the work categories on
pages 3-4.
DISTRIBUTION OF WORK IN EACH AREA
(Percent-%)
MAN COS
SERV COS
NON-PROFS
UN1VS
COV LABS
TOTAL
Basic
Research
100%
Applied
Research
100%
Technology
Advancement
100%
Development
100%
(Sample)
10
25
15
40
10
100%
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23. This question asks how NASA/NACA, from what you know of then,
appears to have apportioned in-house expenditure for the various
categories of aeronautical work.
Proceed down each of the first two columns in the matrix below.
Indicate the percentage of NASA/NACA expenditures for in-house
aeronautical efforts that you.think probably related to each category.
of work. It alight be worthwhile to again review the definitions of
work on Pages 3-4.
RELATIVE EMPHASIS IN NASA/NACA CENTERS
Basic Research
Applied Research
Technology
Development
TOTAL
,--•''
Apparent
Distribution Expenditures
NACA (to 1958)
100%
NASA
100%
Recommended
Distribution
Of NASA's work
100%
Next, go to the third column in the preceding matrix. For each
category of work, write in the percent of NASA's in-house expenditures
for aeronautics that you think would probably result in the greatest
contribution to American aeronautics.
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APPENDIX C-2
AGENDA • '
Thursday, 5 August 1976
MORNING SESSIONS , _
8;00 - 8;25 INTRODUCTORY SESSION .-...
Location: Regency Room, Rickey's Hyatt House, see
enclosed map. (Coffee and rolls will be available
in the room starting at 7:30 a.m.)
Opening Comments: H. Harvey Album 5 minutes
/ Chairman
Stewart Fliege 5 minutes
Pepperdine University
J. Lloyd Jones 20 minutes
NASA Ames Research Center
8:25-8:45 WORKSHOP METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
• Definitions of organizational segments
9 Definitions of work categories
o Procedures
• Role of Observers : /
The morning session is devoted to establishing a
consensus of views on the following questions:. .
a. Which segments of the aeronautical R&D
community should conduct federally supported
work in (1) basic research, (2) applied
research, (3) technology advancement, and
(4) development? ;i
b. What are the commonly recognized and agreed
upon reasons why such work should be :
conducted by particular segments of the
aeronautical R&D community? - ; •
8:50 - 9:50 HOMOGENEOUS GROUPS
The.participants will be divided into five groups. Each
group will consist of representatives of a single segment
of the aeronautical R&D community. The groups will meet
in separate rooms as follows:
Manufacturing Companies Rm. A Universities Rm. D
. Service R&D Companies Rm. B Government Labs Rm. E
Non-profit Institutions Rm. C
H190 . : -- .'.,-.-;;- '-. - , ,-, -.-:..- •"...- ':
9:55 - 10:20 REVIEW AND EXPANSION OF RATIONALE
The groups will go through a rotation process by which
they will review and expand upon each other's logic.
Room assignments:
Universities
Government Labs
*m. E
Rm. A
Universities
Government Labs
Universities
Government Labs
Universities
Government Labs
Rm. A
Rm. B
Rm. B
Rm. C
Rm. C
Rm. D
Manufacturing Companies Rm. B
Service R&D Companies Rm. C
Non-prpfit Institutions Rm. D
10:20 - 10:35 BREAK
10:35 - 11:00 Room Assignments:
Manufacturing Companies Rm. C
Service R&D Companies Rm. D
Non-profit Institutions Rm. E
11:05-11:30 Room Assignments:
Manufacturing Companies Rm. D
Service R&D Companies Rm. E
Non-profit Institutions Rm. A
11:35 - noon Room Assignments:
Manufacturing Companies Rm. E
Service R&D Companies Rm. A
. Non-profit Institutions Rm. B
noon - 1:00 LUNCH
AFTERNOON SESSIONS
1:30 - 1:50 GENERAL SESSION. Regency Room
9 Review of morning results
» Explanation of objectives and methodology
for afternoon
The afternoon session is aimed at establishing a con-
sensus of views, if possible, on the following questions:
a. What is the relative importance of the agreed-upon
reasons for various segments of the aeronautical
R&D community conducting given categories of
government funded work?
b. Roughly, what should be the percentage distribution
of federally supported work (federal funding)-among
the various segments of the aeronautical community
for each category of work?
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2:00 - 3:20 MIXED GROUPS
The participants will again be divided into five groups;
however, this time each group will consist of one repre-
sentative from each of the five segments of the .. . . '
aeronautical R&D community. Each of th.ese groups will
meet in a separate room where the participants will. -
concentrate on a particular category of work. However,
one group will be concerned specifically with in-house
work by NASA Laboratories.
Room assignments:
Basic Research Rm. A Development Rm. D
Applied Research Rm. B NASA Rm. E
Technology Advancement Rm. C
3:20 - 3:35 BREAK
3:35 - 5:00 GENERAL SESSION. Regency Room
t Reports on results of mixed group sessions
• Registering individual views (written)
5:00 - 5:20 FEDERAL FUNDING FOR AERONAUTICS - GENERAL DISCUSSION
e Review disposition of federal funding
(J. R. Chirichiello)
• Concluding remarks *
(H. H. Album)
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APPENDIX C-3
EXAMPLE OF FLIP CHART
do not
write
in this
column
TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT/UNIVS
A. The training of students for the later practice of
engineering is furthered by university activity in
technology advancement.
B. Experience has shown in some cases, that the Government
can obtain outstanding technology advancement from
universities, '." • :
C. The effort in universities to achieve large jumps in
technology can serendipitously stimulate the development
of fundamental fields in engineering science.
D. The presence in a university of fundamental scientists
contributes to the innovative thinking process essential
•to the achievement of large technology jumps.
lY
f:
ft-
ft1
I
I-
3r
"!'..
RATIONALE
FOR
CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED AERONAUTICAL WORK
Rank
Order BORK CATEGORY: TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT BY SEGMENT: VtiIVS
REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF WORK BY THIS SEGMENT
The training of students for the later practice of engineer-
A. ing is furthered by ' university activity in technology
advancement.
Experience has shcun in some cases, that the Government can
B- obtain cutstanding technology advancement from, universities.
The effort .in universities to achieve large jumps in tech-
C. nology can eerendipitously stimulate the development of
fundamental fields in engineering science.
The presence in a university of fundamental scientists
D. contributes to the innovative thinking process essential to
the achievement of larae technology Jumps.
-
+ Reason Entered by this group (at least 3 members)
9 Reason deleted by this group (at least 4 members)
Man. Co.
e
Serv.Co.
0
+
Non-Prof.
-
Univ's
+
+
+
Gov.Labs
0 •
•
•
:i
-om
o
»-H
x
?
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APPENDIX C-5
RANKING METHODS AND COMPUTATIONS
INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS , •
T;>e aeronautical leaders ranked many factors in the survey
questionnaire and during the workshop. For instance, in the question-
!
 naire, the participants ranked various types of organizations on the
relative quality of R&D they tend to perform. Another important exam-
ple was at the conclusion of t:ie workshop when the participants ranked
the basic rationale for government use of particular sectors of the
aeronautical R&D community for conducting given categories of work, In
all cases, the number 1 was used to indicate the highest rank in terms
of merit and a larger number indicated a lower degree of merit. The
numerical rankings extended from 1 to 5 or 6. The participants were ,,.
not to skip numbers or use tied numerical rankings.
The ranking procedures for the survey questionnaire were the
same as those for the workshop, with only two exceptions. The partici-
pants could use two additional types of rankings during the workshop.
After ranking five statements of rationale from 1 to 5, they could then
use blanks to indicate that rationale statements were valid, but of
less significance than the numerically ranked items. They could also
use a blackball (») to indicate that statements of rationale were
incorrect or invalid. : ;
There were occasional ties, omissions, and other errors 'in the
rankings submitted by the participants. Ties were incorrectly awarded
for 0.8 percent of the total number of survey questionnaire ranks
returned by all participants and in less than 0.1 percent of the total
individual workshop ranks. Ranks were inappropriately left blank in
5.7 percent of the total number of rankings returned with the survey
questionnaires. The ties and omissions could have reflected the parti-
cipants' inability to differentiate among rankings for certain vari-
ables, a failure to understand the instructions, or simply a lack of
interest. Ties and omissions were corrected in cases where the
S'l
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intended relative rankings were obvious. The remainder of the errors
and omissions were taken into account in the scoring procedures. This
procedure essentially treated ties and omissions as if the participants
could not distinguish among the relative rankings of the associated
variables. ' .. . -
SCORING INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS . , . ' . .
Individual rankings were scored in a manner intended to provide
complete and consistent sets of rankings for determining the statisti-
cal significance of the individual rankings and to formulate group con-
sensus rankings. The scoring was done as follows:
Step 1. Whenever it was possible, errors were corrected
to reflect the exact ranking order intended by
the participant. ;
Step 2. Next, ties were given scores equal to the average
. of the ranks they would have had if they had been
ranked in order, beginning after the next lowest
discrete numerical rank.
Step 3. The scores of the other discrete numerical rankings
were then adjusted upward or downward as would have
been necessary if the ties had been ranked.
I Step 4. Blanks were then given the next greatest scores.
The blanks were scored as the average of the ranks
. they would have had if they had been ranked in
• I . order beginning with the next highest rank possible
; after all the ties had been ranked in order.
; Step 5. Blackballs ta) were scdred last. They received
the highest numerical score possible for a given
ranking by an individual. Blackballs were set
,..;/ equal to the average of the numerical ranks they.
would have had if they had been ranked in order up
to the greatest possible value for that ranking.
The three examples on the following page illustrate this-
scoring procedure. .
POOR
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Example 1;
SCORING STEPS
Participant's ranking
1. Corrections
2. Scoring ties
Example 2:
SCORING STEPS
Participant's ranking
1. Corrections
2. Scoring ties
3. Adjusting scores
Examples (Workshop only):
SCORING STEPS
Participant's ranking
1. Corrections
2. Scoring ties
3. Adjusting scores
4. Scoring blanks
5. Scoring blackballs
GROUP CONSENSUS RANKING -
A group consensus ranking is a measure of the opinion of a
group, as a whole* in regard to the correct ranking of items that are
ranked in order by the individual members of the group. The group
consensus ranking is the best estimate of group opinion when the rela-
tive rankings by members of a group are statistically significant
(71:100 to 102). In the current study, this is taken as a lave! of
probability of 95 percent or higher that the differences in ranking,
among all the items were not due to chance.
VARIABLES
A_
2
1
1
JL
5
5.
4.5
C
4
3
3
D
3
2
2
E
5
5
4.5
VARIABLES
A_
2
1
1
1
A_
2
2
2
2
2
2
B
3
3
2.5
2.5
B
5
4
4
5
5
5
C
3
3
2.5
2.5
C
1
1
.1
1
1
1
D
4
4
4.5
4.5
D
6.5
6.5
E F
5 4
5 4
5 4.5
6 4.5
JL.-JL _G_ _H L
3 » 3 •
3 e 3 e
3.5 « 3.5 e
3.5 e 3.5 o
3.5 o 6.5. 3.5 e
3.5 8.5 6.5 3.5 8.i
The group consensus ranking is operationally defined by the
following measurements and procedures for calculating them:
Step 1. The scores discussed in the previous section were
truncated to reduce distortions caused by high
values assigned to blanks and blackballs. This
often occurred when the number of judges was
smaller than the number of items bein? ranked.
Blanks were limited to a maximum value of 6 and
blackballs were assigned a maximum value of 7.
Step 2. Then a group's scores for any one item were averaged.
: This was done individually for each item that was
being ranked by the group.
Step 3. If four-fifths of a group awarded any item a L-lack-
ball then that item received a final group-consensus
rank of o (meaning invalid or incorrect).
Step 4. The other items being ranked were then awarded
; positive integer ranks in the same numerical order
. as the average scores. This began with the
number 1 and continued progressively toward higher
. . numbers. •' , .;,..
Step 5. Equal tied ranks were awarded in cases where the
averages fell within a specific maximum interval of
each other. This interval was taken as 0.25 based
on a qualitative comparison;of the data; The lowest
average score involved established the base of this
interval. ; •
Step 6. Ties were given the minimum numerical value they
, would have had if they had been ranked in order.
Step 7. The remaining rankings were then adjusted to the
values they would have had if the ties had all been
ranked in order. Thir- process skips the other
intermediate ranks which would have been spanned by
the ties.
ORIGINALPAGEK
OF POOR QUALITY
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The following example illustrates the process for calculating
group consensus rankings for the workshop results.
Example for a Single Judge
Score
Truncating
Example for a Group of
Judges
#2
#3
H '
Averaging
Rankings
Adjusting for Ties
A B
•^UM— -BV^B.
2 5
2 5
ITEMS
D E F H
1 6.5 3.5 8.5 6.5 3.5 8.5
1 6 3.5 7 6 3.5 7
ITEMS
D E H I
2
7
1
1
5
6
5
4
2 . 6
1
2
2
2
1
6 3.5 7 6 3.5 7
5 3 7 7 4 1
6 4 7 7 3 6
5 3 6 7 6 6
5 3.5 6 7 3.5 7
2.6 5.2 1.6 5.4 3.4 6.5
 9 4 5.4
2 5 1 5 3 . 7 • 4 5
2 5 1 5 3 8 t 4 5
APPENDIX C-6
EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT FORMS
RELATIVE EMPHASIS IN NASA/NACA CENTERS
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Basic Research
Applied Research
Technology
Development
TOTAL
Recommended
Distribution
of NASA's work
.
100%
DISTRIBUTION OF WORK I.V EACH. AREA
(Percent %)
Man. Go's
Serv.Co's
Non-Prof's
Univ's
Gov. Lab's
TOTAL
Basic
Research
100%
Applied
Research
100%
Technology
Advancement
100% '
Product
Development
1 00%
(Sample)
-— OBBOQ
10
25
15
40
10
100%
OF
~Ei
'^•'•:>
£v '-
<si? ,'
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INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS
.DO NOT INDICATE YOUR NAME
Check below the type of organization that best describes the principal
nature of your company, division, institution or government organization.
(Check one)
Manufacturing Company
Service R 5 D Company
Non-Profit R 6 D Inst.
[~1 Government Lab
PI Government R 6 D Fund. Org.
G Other
(Write in)
Check below the kind of aeronautical work that you are primarily concerned
about in your current position.
Basic Research
Applied Research
Technology Advancement
Product Development
Other '(Write in)
-
:
..-v
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'."•:'"•",•; APPENDIX C-7
PARTICIPANTS' REACTION TO TRIBUTARY TECHNIQUE
.Ml
RESPONSES TO; "MERE COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVED BY THE
NORKSHOP METHODOLOGY RELATIVE TO THE METHODOLOGY Of
PREVIOUS ADVISORY GROUPS YOU HAVE PARTICIPATED IN, ON
HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE TOPICS. WHERE ADVISORS HAD NATURALLY
DIVERSE CROUP INTERESTS!"
I
3£ so
SAME OR
NOT MUCH
•i; FIGURE 16: CRITIQUE OF TRIBUTARY TECffllGUE ASCOmUNICATlON HECHARISH
RESPOHSES TO: "ARE YOU KOH INTERESTED IN USING THE
TRIBUTARY METHOD OR A MODIFIED FORM OF IT FOR YOUR OWN
ADVISORY CROUPS!"
NO. PERHAPS: YES
NO OPPORTUNITY UNCERTAIN
FIGURE 17: FURTHER USE OF TRIBUTARY TECHNIOUE
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RESPONSES Tn, "DO YOU THINK THAT BETTER RESULTS until !>
HAVE BEEN OBTAINED WITH HORE TIME ALLOWED?"
20 f
•-TO TWO DAYS
NSTRUCTIONS
DEBATE TIME
NO. ONLY SLIGHTLY IN PLACESHO:
FIGURE IS: CRITIOUE OF TIME FACTOR
RESPONSES TQr "WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AT THIS POINT OF
THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF THE RESULTS OF THE WORKSHOP YOU
HAVE JUST COMPLETED?"
OPTIMISTIC
Ar RESPONSES
PROBABLY
, LOW OR
MARGINAL '
VALUE
FIGURE 19:
DO NOT
KNOW
MOCH OF IT
PROBABLY
VALUABLE
PROBABLY
VALUABLE
EXTENT OF OPTIMISM OK USAGE OF RESULTS;
END OF WORKSHOP .
